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ABSTRACT

Responses of four revisionist historians and economists to Diane Ravitch's review of their works are presented. Those defending the revisionist viewpoint are: Walter Feinberg, Harvey Kantor, Michael Katz, and Paul Violas. (JD)

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REVISIONISTS RESPOND TO RAVITCH

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Revisionists Respond to Ravitch

Introduction

In the Spring of 1976, Diane Ravitch of Teachers College, Columbia University, prepared an essay-review on the works of a number of American scholars popularly known as "revisionists."[1] The review was commissioned by the then President of the National Academy of Education, Patrick Suppes. Later, Professor Ravitch's review was expanded into a book, The Revisionists Revised: A Critique of the Radical Attack on the Schools (New York: Basic Books, 1978).

The choice of Professor Ravitch to undertake a serious review of several works by revisionist historians and economists was not dictated by any malice of Academy members towards various authors or towards a particular historical point of view. It was the judgment of informed Academy members that Professor Ravitch would be likely to write a spirited and though-provoking essay. Her own recent work on The Great School Wars had received critical acclaim. She was known personally to a number of Academy members as a bright and lucid writer.

What emerged from Professor Ravitch's pen, first as a review and then as a book, was greeted by some readers as

an unduly polemical attack upon courageous and responsible scholarship; by others as an overdue correction to the polemical historiography of some of the revisionists themselves. In any case, few undertakings by the Academy have provoked a more vigorous and contentious response. In the light of the reaction to the initial Ravitch review, President Patrick Suppes asked a number of revisionists to respond to Professor Ravitch, and assured them that their responses would be appropriately published by the Academy. At that time (April 1977), no revisionist responded to President Suppes' proposal.

In 1979, as the new President of the Academy, I renewed the Academy's offer to collect and publish responsible rejoinders to Professor Ravitch. This time a number of revisionists responded positively. What follows are their reactions to Professor Ravitch's critique. The Academy gave Professor Ravitch an opportunity to comment on the rejoinders. She demurred, expressing the belief that her book spoke for itself.

The Academy, in the spirit of free academic discourse, is pleased to make the revisionists' responses to Professor Ravitch available to the attentive public. The officers of the Academy are grateful to those who have prepared the following papers and have granted the Academy the privilege of publishing or republishing their points of view.

Stephen K. Bailey

President
National Academy of Education

[1]Schooling in Capitalist America: Educational Reform and the Contradictions of Economic Life, by Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis. New York: Basic Books, 1976. 340pp. $13.95.

Reason and Rhetoric: The Intellectual Foundations of Twentieth Century Liberal Educational Policy, by Walter Feinberg. New York: Wiley, 1975. 287pp. $11.00.

War, Technology, and Education: Dissenting Essays in the Intellectual Foundations of American Education, edited by Walter Feinberg and Henry Rosemont, Jr. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1975. 222pp. $10.00.

The Great School Legend: A Revisionist Interpretation of American Public Education, by Colin Greer. New York: Basic Books, 1972. 206pp. $6.95.

Roots of Crisis: American Education in the Twentieth Century, by Clarence J. Karier, Paul Violas, and Joel Spring. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1973. 243pp. $5.95.

Shaping the American Educational State: 1900 to the Present, edited by Clarence J. Karier. New York: Free Press, 1975. 439pp. $10.95 (paper, $5.95).

Class, Bureaucracy, and Schools: The Illusion of Educational Change in America, by Michael Katz. New York: Praeger, 1971. 158pp. $5.95.

The Irony of Early School Reform: Educational Innovation in Mid-nineteenth Century Massachusetts, by Michael Katz. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968. 325pp. $14.00 (paper, $2.95).

Education and the Rise of the Corporate State, by Joel H. Spring. Boston: Beacon Press, 1972. 206pp. $7.95.

A Primer of Libertarian Education, by Joel H. Spring. New York: Free Life Editions, 1975. 157pp. $3.95.

Dewey as a Cultural Symbol: A Response to Diane Ravitch*

by

Walter Feinberg

I. The Sustaining Influence of Liberalism

To a large extent the debate over Dewey, which Diane Ravitch focuses upon in her treatment of my book, Reason and Rhetoric,** is really a debate about the viability of the liberal model for social change and the possibility that it holds for human progress. Before looking at Ravitch's treatment of Reason and Rhetoric and of Dewey, I want to look at the image of American society as it is revealed by her treatment of the question of the extent to which progress marks the experience of blacks in recent times. The question of black progress is important in my case, because it, along with the Vietnam War, was a major factor in bringing me to question the liberal model of social organization. Thus, by looking at her treatment of this issue I hope to highlight a major point of disagreement between myself and some others who, like Ravitch, continue to find the more traditional liberal arguments persuasive.

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* I wish to thank Eric Bredo, Linda Houghton, Ernest Kahane, Stephen Norris, Philip Steedman, and Jeffrey Tank for their helpful comments in preparing this paper. (A draft of this paper originally appeared in The Gadfly, Vol. 1, Nos. 5,6.)

** The full title is Reason and Rhetoric: The Intellectual Foundations of Twentieth Century Educational Policy, N.Y.: John Wiley, 1975.

In her monograph Ravitch treats a number of issues among which the question of black progress is but one. And while she, herself, does not connect up her treatment of this issue with her treatment of Dewey (contained in her critique of Reason and Rhetoric), they can be related in the following way: one of the major reasons why Dewey focused so much of his attention on schools was that he believed not only that they could be used to ameliorate some of the harsher effects of technology, but also because he felt that they could serve as a key instrument for social progress. They could be the instrument through which society purposefully reconstructs itself. In recent times, however, this belief has come under serious challenge as some scholars have argued that schools tend to reproduce the social division of labor. In focusing upon the recent experience of blacks and arguing the case for progress through education, Ravitch is, albeit implicitly, providing us with a contemporary restatement of Dewey's point of view. Ravitch therefore provides an occasion to see just how significant this idea continues to be in the contemporary liberal's vision of things.

Ravitch acknowledges that discriminatory practices have resulted in disadvantaged positions for blacks and some other minorities. While she agrees that discriminatory practices still exist, she sees a number of hopeful signs, among which is a reported decrease in the number of black families below the poverty line between 1964-1974. Yet the analysis that she give of this fact overlooks a number of considerations.

She attributes this reported decrease largely to liberal policy regarding housing, education and jobs, much of which, she rightly points out, took place under the Johnson administration. Yet Ravitch fails to entertain the hypothesis that at least some of the programs mentioned resulted in part from the economic stimulation brought about by the Vietnam War, an hypothesis which is at least reasonable given the general stagnation and high level of unemployment (especially among sectors of the black population) which have reoccurred since the war. Nor does she entertain the possibility that such programs were only partly a function of administration policy, and she does not consider the role of grass roots movement for civil rights in promoting change. Of course if the issue is merely one of administrative policy, then Ravitch is correct; a certain amount of domestic progress was accomplished during the Johnson administration that had not been accomplished prior to it. Yet if the question is broadened to ask what are the conditions and limits of progressive legislation in a society like the United States, then it is also important to see the extent to which such progress has been sustained. Thus Ravitch argues that such progress has continued, and an examination of aspects of this argument can reveal a good deal about the modern liberal perspective. Ravitch writes:

> The overall income gap between blacks and whites remains large, though it has narrowed. Black family income in 1974 was only 58 percent of white

> family income compared to 54 percent in 1964. But poverty was not randomly spread among blacks. Young black families in the North and West, those in which both spouses were employed, had incomes that were 99 percent of the income of equivalent white families; even in the South, where black earnings were lowest, these families earned 87 percent of the income of corresponding white families.[1]

Ravitch uses these figures to indicate a trend toward greater equality between blacks and whites, and to conclude that: "those blacks who are under thirty-five, well educated, and middle-class have achieved virtual full economic equality with their white peers."[2] And this further indicates for her that "for the first time in American history, blacks can achieve equality through some of the same mechanisms that other groups have used and from which blacks have previously been excluded."[3] The fact that Ravitch takes the black middle-class as a major index of progress is problematic in itself. For surely one would want to know not only the relative well-being of the black middle-class in relation to its white counterpart, but also the relative sizes of the middle-classes in each group as a percentage of the whole group. And one would also want to know the relative well-being of the lower classes in relationship to the middle-classes in both groups. Even given the indices she does use, however, the picture is not as optimistic as she paints it. Nevertheless, parity between the groups that Ravitch mentions appears impressive. Indeed, in a later Bureau of the Census report the ratio of black to white median income for 1974 is even slightly higher for young, two-working-parent families in the North and West

than the one Ravitch cites--1.07 (although only .84 for the South.)[4] That is, it appears impressive until one realizes that Ravitch is writing about a group that comprised, as the above census report describes it: "a very small proportion (6 percent) of all Black families in this country in 1974."[5] Of course when considering only such families in the North and West as a portion of the whole the percentage shrinks even more.

There are other factors as well which Ravitch fails to note, but which also cast doubt on her view of black progress. For example, a chart in the earlier government publication which Ravitch cites shows that when all families in the North and West are taken into consideration there was, surprisingly, an actual comparative decline in the proportion of black to white income between the years 1959 and 1973 (from .71 to .65) after an initial increase in 1969 and 1970. The same is true of all families in the North and West where the head is under 35 years of age, although here tha major decline is from 1969 to 1973 and seems to include all regions except the South where there is a comparative gain (from .62 in 1969 and 1970 to .66 in 1973, as compared to .74 in 1969 to .61 in 1973 in the North and West).[6] Second, and more important, Ravitch fails to note that there has been an actual decline in black husband and wife families as a percentage of all black families from 1970 to 1974. Indeed, since 1960 when 66% of nonwhite children lived with both parents, the figure is reported to have fallen to 49% in 1975.[7] Since the percent-

age of all such families is on the decline, and since the young families with two parents working comprise but 6% of the total of all black families, these figures surely cannot be used unambiguously to indicate a trend towards equality.

It is instructive at this point to quote from a passage (not quoted by Ravitch) from the report that Ravitch uses but which provides quite a different picture of black progress than the one she draws.

> As is noted in the Family section of this report, black husband-wife families as a percent of all black families have declined; virtually no changes have been observed for their white counterparts during the period 1970 to 1974 (income year). (See table 72). The husband-wife families generally have median incomes which are higher than those of other types of families, primarily because they are more likely to have at least two earners. In 1974, black husband-wife families had a median income of $12,982 compared to $7,942 for black families headed by a male with no wife present and $4,465 for black families headed by a female. Thus, the decline in the proportion of black husband-wife families would have a downward influence upon the median income of all black families (table 16).
>
> In the past, not only have proportionally more black than white wives worked to supplement the income resources of their families, but their contributions have been greater. Since 1970, the proportion of black husband-wife families with wives in the paid labor force has fluctuated; however, the percentage in 1974 (54 percent) was the same as that in 1970. During the same time period, the proportion for their white counterparts had increased from 38 to 42 percent. (From 1967 to 1970, both racial groups had experienced increases in this proportion.) The income levels of black husband-wife families with a wife in the paid labor force has risen from 1970 to 1974; but, these families have not improved their income status relative to comparable white families. (Black to white income ratio was about 78 percent for these families

in both 1970 and 1974.) Between 1970 and 1974, the decline in the proportion of black husband-wife families has reduced the proportion of all black families with wives in the paid labor force. This pattern combined with changes which have occurred among white families has produced a downward effect upon the overall income ratio of black to white families in the '70's (tables 15 and 16).[8]

Thus the question of whether black progress continues would seem to be indeed more mixed than Ravitch's report indicates. It is true that among all younger families with both husband and wife present (whether working or not) there has been an increase in comparative income from 1970 to 1973 on a national scale. However this increase nationally seems to be a function of an increase in the South alone whereas the figures for the North and West show a decrease. What Ravitch does not emphasize, however, is that according to another chart in the publication she cites, when all families are taken into account nationally, there has been a slight comparative decrease in black family income from 1967 to 1973 when compared to white family income.[9] And even though other studies indicate a gain from 1973 to 1975,[10] nevertheless, in virtually every category black unemployment is significaltly higher than white (generally about twice as high).[11] Some indices which Ravitch does not cite but which are included in the same publication from which she drew her earlier figures serve to make the issue of progress even more complicated. In 1973 the black infant mortality rate, although improved in absolute terms, stood only slightly better than the white rate did in 1950.[12] Perhaps even

more striking is the fact that black males in every age category from one year through age twenty-five could expect to live longer in 1959-61 than they could in 1973, and those in the forty-year-old age group could expect to live exactly as long in 1973 as they could in 1959-60. On the other hand, in each of these categories white men have shown reasonable gains as have both black and white women, although a black female infant can still expect to live about six years less than her white counterpart.[13]

Before I attempt to draw some general conclusions from Ravitch's discussion, it will be useful to emphasize just how ambiguous is the issue of progress among the black population. It is true that given traditional indices of material progress there are reported significant gains in such areas as educational attainment, rise in income, and occupational prestige during the 1960's. Moreover some of these gains are reported to have persisted even during the depressed economic years of the early 1970's. Others, such as the unemployment rate, did not. In appraising the significance of these gains, Farley correctly notes that:

> Reductions in inequality are small when compared to remaining racial differences on many indicators. A continuation of the trends of the 1960s and 1970s offers no hope that racial differences will be eliminated soon. For instance, a higher proportion of white men in 1940 than black men in 1976 held white-collar jobs. The purchasing power of the typical black family in 1974 was equivalent to that of a white family twenty years earlier, and the earnings of black men lag far behind those of white men.[14]

A section of the census report which Ravitch did not use

strikes a most discouraging note for blacks as well as whites as it examines developments in 1974 and 1975.

The employment situation for both black and white workers deteriorated during 1974 and early 1975 in line with the general downturn in the economy. Large increases in unemployment coupled with fairly widespread cutbacks in employment were experienced by both races. In contrast, there had been substantial improvements in employment for blacks and whites between 1972 and 1973.

Unemployment rates for both blacks and whites had declined to 3-½ year lows in the third and fourth quarters of 1973 and were 8.6 percent and 4.3 percent (seasonally adjusted), respectively, during the fourth quarter of 1973. As labor market conditions deteriorated, jobless rates surged during late 1974 and early 1975, reaching 13.7 percent for black and other races and 7.6 percent for whites in the first quarter of 1975. For adult men the jobless rate for both black and other races and whites doubled from late 1973, and was 11.1 percent and 5.8 percent, respectively, during the first quarter of 1975. For teenagers, the jobless rate for black and other races reached 39.8 percent in early 1975, compared with 18.0 percent for whites (tables 30 and 31).

The steep rise in unemployment was accompanied by sharp cutbacks in employment for workers of both races. Employment, which stood at 9 million for black and other races and 75.2 million for whites during the first quarter of 1975, was down sharply from high levels posted in early and mid-1974.

Paralleling these developments in employment and unemployment were increases in the number of persons of both white and black and other races who were nonparticipants in the labor force. Of particular interest within this group are those persons not in the labor force due to discouragement over job prospects. (These persons, often called the "hidden unemployed," want jobs but are not looking for work because they believe their search would be in vain.) Their number, which had averaged about 525,000 white and 160,000 persons of black and other races in 1974, began

to rise sharply in late 1974 and reached levels of about 800,000 and 315,000, respectively, during the first quarter of 1975. Among persons not in the labor force in early 1974, 4.4 percent of the black and other races and 1.5 percent of whites were discouraged workers.

Even though Ravitch grants that inequities continue to persist, the image that she draws is one in which progress within the black population continues. Her view suggests that such progress can be best explained by the kind of administrative policies which were initiated during the Johnson administration, and which, if continued, will assure that it persists. Moreover, in her treatment of such issues as federal support for compensatory education, she reports that "the amount appropriated by the federal government was not 'drastically reduced'" and in the specific cases she refers to was increased.[16]

While many factors, including at one point the highest unemployment rate among blacks since World War II (a level which may have been reached after Ravitch's monograph was published but before her book was printed), would cast doubt upon Ravitch's image of continued progress, there is clear evidence that progress in many areas has slowed significantly since the 1960's. Moreover, the decline seems generally immune to whether a Republican or a Democratic administration has been in office. If Ravitch is correct about the continuation into the 1970's of certain key administrative educational policies that were begun in the 1960's, and if she is suggesting that the reported fact that the continued level of funding in the area of compensatory education is

typical of other programs as well, then a reasonable question should be: why then the general slowdown in most areas and the retreat in others? Ravitch avoids asking such a question, and thereby also avoids considering what the limits to social reform might be in societies like the United States.

It is in the failure to ask this kind of question that I believe Ravitch shares some important ground with Dewey. However, the issue is less what Dewey believed than it is what he has come to represent. While Dewey's belief that the schools could become the institution through which society progressively reconstructs itself has become a guiding principle of liberal policy, he also warned that problems need to be considered in light of their own peculiar circumstances. This warning could lead one to speculate that even Dewey might now agree that his belief in schools has been overextended. Nevertheless, as I have pointed out elsewhere[17], by focusing so heavily upon the school, and by dismissing prematurely a class analysis of American society in favor of the interest group theory, Dewey was unable to examine some of the structural limits to progress. In addition, his strong belief that social institutions needed to be consistent with the potential for technological growth made it difficult for him to reflect upon the traditional measures of progress. Ravitch, writing under somewhat different circumstances, still finds little reason to reflect upon the traditional measures of progress, and indeed holds firmly to the idea of continuing progress even in light of evidence that is at best mixed.

For example, she finds significant the fact that young, black, two-parent families have approached parity with similar white families, but she does not find the fact that the percentage of two parent families is decreasing significantly enough to warrant even a footnote. Similarly her vision of progress is maintained by overlooking the fact that young black families with two parents working comprise but 6 percent of the total of all black families.

Yet to show that the signs of black progress are more mixed than Ravitch suggests, and to leave the matter there, would be to confine the debate to her terms and to grant more than is reasonable. Implicit in Ravitch's argument is the view that the progress of our society is to be judged on the basis of how closely the distribution of status and rewards within one group approximates the distribution to be found among the dominant group. On one level the approach is understandable especially when applied to blacks. Given the legal sanctions that have historically been forced upon the black population, some indication of parity would at least show that administrative policy can be used (given grass roots pressure) as an effective corrective measure. Whether Ravitch makes this case convincingly depends of course on how comprehensive is her review of the various indices. Yet even if we were to agree that the prospects are as encouraging as Ravitch believes, an uncritical acceptance of the standards that she used would commit us to accepting a large amount of inequality <u>within</u> different groups. In other

words, if we are concerned primarily with indices of comparative well-being across groups, then the question still remains as to how well-being is to be distributed within groups. Ravitch implicitly cites the distribution pattern of the dominant group as the criterion by which to judge the progress of blacks but one might reasonably hesitate in acknowledging that the level of inequality to be found in that group should be taken as anything but a provisional index of social progress.[18]

While Ravitch's treatment of the question of black progress is interesting in its own right, I believe that it is also useful for understanding the protective reaction of liberal scholars towards Dewey. Overlooking some of the empirical problems in her account of the economic situation of blacks, we find Ravitch arguing that present liberal structures are sufficient to sustain such progress and, implicitly, that existing standards of social progress are essentially non-problematic. One of the major concerns of Reason and Rhetoric was to bring into question these two beliefs, and the treatment of Dewey and other like minded theorists was intended to explore the limits of the liberal ideal among even its most progressive adherents.[19] Rather than addressing Dewey in these terms, Ravitch insists upon viewing the analysis presented in Reason and Rhetoric as a personal attack on Dewey, and thus does not feel obliged to examine the extent to which the liberal model that Dewey and others articulated

is able to sustain progress in our contemporary society. Nevertheless there are some important issues about the nature of an adequate interpretation which Ravitch implicitly raises. By addressing these issues we will be able to see some of the important factors which generate her and my conflicting views of Dewey.

II Dewey, Liberalism, and the Problem of the Interpretive Frame

Ravitch begins her treatment of Reason and Rhetoric by offering the following defense of Dewey:

> Dewey comes in for a large share of Feinberg's criticism, and much of it is based on the presentist assumption that Dewey should have known then what Feinberg knows now. For example, Feinberg perceives social class bias in John and Evelyn Dewey's Schools of Tomorrow, but radicals who were Dewey's contemporaries saw it differently. The Modern School Journal, a publication of educational radicals in the early twentieth century frequently recommended the book that Feinberg now calls "class biased."[20]

In her concern to defend Dewey, Ravitch unfortunately misrepresents what I said. The misrepresentation can be used productively, however, for by examining it closely we can begin to understand some of the factors by which two different interpretations are generated.

To begin, the words "class biased" appear in quotes in Ravitch's original passage preceded by the words "that Feinberg now calls" and are followed by the footnote number 81 in the National Academy Publication which refers the reader to pages 108-111 in Reason and Rhetoric. This gives the impression

that I used this term in those pages to describe the Dewey volume referred to. Yet nowhere in those pages is the term "class bias" as referring to Schools of Tomorrow to be found (nor could I find the term anywhere else in the book). Now this may seem like a small point given the fact that those three pages are in fact discussing certain observations made by Dewey which could properly be termed bias, and given too that few texts are immune from editorial errors. Yet, Ravitch's particular error is significant because she builds her major criticism of my book on it. Indeed, her claim that I called Dewey's treatment "class biased" in the place where she refers to it suggests that I was primarily interested in the origins of Dewey's perceptions (in some kind of social class heritage on his part) when in fact I was interested in something else entirely--the nature of the perceptions themselves.[21] Of course, the attribution of the words "class bias" to me allows Ravitch to dismiss many of the details that were present in my treatment of Dewey on this issue. However what is more important to notice is the fact that the term "class bias" is Ravitch's, not mine, and that while she draws it as a conclusion from the analysis which I gave, she does not refute that analysis. I believe that her conclusion is in fact a reasonable one, but of course, Ravitch does wish to deny the validity of the conclusion she draws. She attempts to do so by noting that a journal which she calls "a publication of educational radicals" recommended Dewey's book. Yet while this fact may speak to the pervasiveness of Dewey's views among certain groups, it is difficult to believe that Ravitch really means it to be sufficient for an endorsement of them, given her

general treatment of contemporary educational radicals. Nor, of course, does it speak to the question of class bias since if it is the case that Dewey was class biased, and if the "radical" publication that Ravitch mentions agrees with him in those cases where he displayed his class bias, then its views would likely be subject to the same analysis. Ravitch says nothing about these issues.

The more interesting and the more central point of Ravitch's analysis however, is her view that my criticism of Dewey is based on a reading back into the past of knowledge that has been attained in the present. There is a certain irony in this criticism because an article of mine which appeared contemporaneously with the publication of Ravitch's monograph attempted to understand the difference between traditional and revisionist treatment of American schooling in terms not all together dissimilar from the one that Ravitch applies here.[22] I argued that part of the force of some revisionist critiques rests on a shift in the way in which equality of opportunity is to be understood. While it is unneccessary here to reiterate the details of that article, it is useful to note that while the point that I made was similar to Ravitch's the tone was substantially less critical. To understand what lies behind that difference in tone will help provide a vehicle for understanding some of the interpretive differences between Ravitch and myself. This issue has much to do with the nature of historical scholarship.

To begin with it is useful to make a distinction between a treatment which adopts the point of view of a certain

historical figure, and a treatment which feels obliged to fairly articulate that point of view in the course of providing a critical appraisal of it. Some may wish to argue that the first approach is the only legitimate way to do history, but others may believe that this is an overly narrow view of historical research. Yet even if we accept that the first approach is the only legitimate way to do history, this does not deny that scholarship which chooses to maintain a critical point of view has a legitimate and important role to play. Some people may not wish to call it history, but the label is not very important. What is important in the case under consideration is whether in arriving at this critical view I either left out Dewey's point of view, or distorted it in some way that works to his disadvantage in the reassessment of his work. My concern was to render a fair exposition of the theoretical aspects of liberalism, and where anomolies occurred in the doctrine or its practice, to try to establish a framework in which they made sense. What Ravitch overlooks is that the criticism of Dewey that was offered was done so in the context of an attempt to understand Dewey's point of view. While it would be presumptuous of me to assume that no distortions could be found throughout the pages of Reason and Rhetoric, we can at least look at my treatment of the work that Ravitch does cite, Schools of Tomorrow, in order to understand the difference between her and my understanding of the nature of historical interpretation in this instance.

Ravitch is not very clear about her precise

objection to my treatment of Schools of Tomorrow, (especially since she is mistaken about the one specific point that she cites, i.e., my use of the term "class biased"). I suspect, however, that one of the things that is making her uncomfortable in the pages that she refers to, which deal in part with Dewey's observations about a black vocational school, is my suggestion that Dewey was acquiescing to a segregated institution. In other words, what she may be feeling is that in my treatment of Dewey I imposed certain contemporary values onto the past. If this is indeed the source of her discomfort, then it would be useful to note that integration is not a totally new idea. More significant for understanding Dewey, however, is the fact that given the tone of his general philosophy it is surprising to find him not addressing that problem even when directly confronted by it. Such an oversight would seem to call for an explanation. If the understanding of this event is adequate, it should not only enable us to perceive the deficiencies of Dewey's response in light of our own contemporary values, but should also enable us to perceive the way in which he understood what we now hopefully can agree was in fact an oversight. The point of difference between Ravitch and myself may be illustrated by quoting from selections of the three pages in Reason and Rhetoric which Ravitch cites for its treatment of Schools of Tomorrow. I wrote:

> One of the schools that Dewey reported on in the latter part of the book was P.S. 26...P.S. 26 was an all black school in a poor black slum. In view of the condition of the families in the neighborhood and the poverty that Dewey described,

> the school was carrying on some worthwhile programs and was rightly included...He observed that the school was not attempting to solve the race problem but that it was developing good citizens. If the experiment were to succeed, it would "mean a real step forward in solving the race problem." Yet the program that Dewey then described was strictly a vocational program albeit an excellent one, where much of the school and the neighborhood served as a shop for the students. At a time when much black labor was unskilled or employed as farmhands, a program of skill development was an advance forward. Nevertheless, black boys learned how to cook and black girls how to sew... A more serious shadow is cast over Dewey's evaluation of the experiment as he suggests its greatest value to lie among the youngsters of Negro and immigrant parents...From one point of view, it could be claimed that the school was serving the goal of equality of opportunity since it was providing a passage for some black youngsters into occupations that might otherwise have been closed to them. Moreover, in defense of the school's program it could be argued that training on a higher level might well have proved dysfunctional even to the children themselves since the more advanced academic programs...were generally closed to blacks....
>
> Yet this defense highlights the problems as well as the merits of this approach...Had Dewey so chosen, the description of the school might have provided a suitable occasion to affirm equal opportunity as an ethical value and to analyze the social structure that made vocational education especially appropriate for black and immigrant children.[23]

If my views about the source of the difference between Ravitch and myself are accurate, then it must be said that Ravitch would be correct on at least one point: I was not surrendering my own critical values to the material--but it is not clear why someone should be expected to do that. I was, however, attempting to show the dilemma that Dewey was caught in (although he did not seem to recognize it as such) and to suggest a reasonable way in which the dilemma might have been resolved.

My larger point, made elsewhere in the book, was that Dewey's general philosophical point of view hindered the kind of social analysis which would have been useful in this kind of situation. And that is of course the point which Ravitch seems not to be able to address.

We can understand the difference between Ravitch and myself on a more general level by returning to her observation that a journal published by "educational radicals" frequently recommended Dewey's book. This observation is, of course, intended to chastise me for not taking this fact into account. However, implicit in this remark is more than a criticism of me or a defense of Dewey. In addition, she seems to be proposing that if we wish to capture the signficiance of the works of a historical figure, we must attempt to see those works in the context of their own times and not impose our own meaning on them. Now regardless of whether Ravitch is or is not correct in her criticism of my treatment of Dewey's Schools of Tomorrow, she has certainly raised, albeit implicitly, an important issue for historical interpretation. On its deeper level this issue involves an epistemological question about the nature of our understanding of traditions that are removed in time from our own and about the extent to which our prejudgments can or should be put aside in appraising such traditions. Yet the issue can also be addressed on a surface level, on a level which involves the methods and evidence that are appropriate for analyzing and appraising different texts.

After noting some of the deeper issues involved I want to address some of the surface issues raised by Ravitch.

There is no doubt a need (as Ravitch suggests) in historical interpretation to be sensitive to the meaning that an author intended to convey when writing a work, and to try to avoid imposing a new, and perhaps more contemporary meaning on the concepts that the author uses. As Gadamer has written: "Whoever has a sense of the historical knows what is possible for an age and what is not, and has a sense of the difference of the past in relation to the present."[24] An adequate interpretation of historical texts presupposes that to whatever extent possible the interpreter remain true to the meaning that was originally intended. However the same term can be used to communicate two different concepts--an older one and a newer one--the need for the interpreter to remain faithful to the meaning of the term as originally used does not preclude an appraisal of the value of the concepts in their own rights. If, for example, equality of opportunity means one thing to educators writing in the 1840's, and another to revisionist interpreters assessing their work in the 1970's, then these differences can be revealed and arguments brought to bear on behalf of each of them.

Yet the fact that interpretation requires that one try to recapture the original as it was then intended does not mean that the task of interpretation must end at that point. Subsequent perceptions add a significance to historical events

that go beyond their original comprehension. For example, when the film "Birth of a Nation" was previewed in President Wilson's White House it was likely shown because of the technical advances in film making which it illustrated. However, what is also significant about this even for us is the fact that its glorification of the Klan was not even raised to the level of significance by the officials who previewed that film.

Ravitch, of course, only approaches these issues obliquely, and does not reveal a full understanding of some of the questions involved. Nevertheless, she does lay down as a first criterion that the original meaning of the text be captured in the interpretation of it. It is questionable, however, in the one place in her examiniation of Reason and Rhetoric where she treats a passage from Dewey's work whether she actually does this. Ravitch begins by reiterating my treatment of a passage written by Dewey for the New Republic and directed by him at the pacifist movement during World War I. My citation of the passage actually occurs in a footnote in Reason and Rhetoric in the context of a discussion of Dewey's value theory. The intent of the larger discussion, which Ravitch does not allude to,is to argue that Dewey's provisional view of values weakened some of the conceptual safeguards against the manipulation of people for the purpose of achieving "desired" social ends. The discussion of this issue is somewhat complex, and it is not necessary to treat it here. However it should be said that the section was

written in the context of an examination of some revisionist writings, and I was attempting to assess first the extent to which the progressive point of view could be seen as manipulative, and second, the degree to which the charge of manipulation can be construed as an ultimate critical category. In other words, I was concerned with the question of whether or not manipulation can ever be justified, and if so, then in what way the charge of manipulation, when directed against progressive theory and practice, can be taken as criticism. This discussion is bypassed by Ravitch and instead she chooses to focus on the passage cited in the footnote. Given this, it will be useful to look at the passage along with Ravitch's and my treatment of it. Dewey wrote of the pacificists:

> If at a critical juncture the moving force of events is always too much for conscience, the remedy is not to deplore the wickedness of those who manipulate events. Such a conscience is largely self-conceit. The remedy is to connect conscience with the forces that are moving in another direction. Then will conscience itself have compulsive power instead of being forever the martyred and the coerced.[25]

My comment in the footnote which Ravitch picks up is that the passage leaves little room for the moral prophet unless he is able to develop a political movement behind him, and that the statement leaves little room for the pacifism of the First World War. Ravitch then comments: "This is an odd ground on which to criticize Dewey. Obviously, he was not trying to silence moral prophets; on the contrary, he was urging pacifists to organize in order to have an impact on policy.... it is clear that Dewey was urging pacifists to get involved in political action..."[26] It is important to notice here how

Ravitch begins by escalating my language. She moves from my claim that Dewey would have little room for the moral prophet who did not have a political movement behind him, to her refutation of a different claim, which she wrongly attributes to me, that Dewey was attempting to "silence moral prophets." Secondly, her interpretation of the passage from Dewey simply assumes that the pacifists were not organized (or, at least that Dewey thought that they were not) and that they were not engaged in political action. Certainly these assumptions seem counter to our general knowledge and clearly deserve an argument. Ravitch provides none. Thirdly, the unstated implication of Ravitch's response seems reasonably clear: Dewey was on the side of the pacifists in opposing the war while objecting only to their ineffective methods in pursuing their cause. Clearly this is wrong. It is true that in the New Republic article, Dewey joins hands with the pacifists on an abstract level. He writes: "The more one loves peace (of course I do not mean by peace the mere absence of military war) the more one is bound to ask himself how the machinery, the specific concrete social arrangements, exactly comparable to physical engineering devices, for maintaining peace, are to be brought about."[27] However this was but on the abstract level and clearly bypasses the immediate issue of the involvement of the United States in the First World War.

Ravitch misses the point of this entire discussion (which is not surprising given that she focused her attention on a

footnote). What is more interesting however is the way that she misses the point. For the issue was not whether Dewey did or did not support the First World War, nor was he being chastised for attempting to silence the pacificists-- he did not attempt this and no claim was made that he did. Dewey wanted the pacifists and others to be allowed to speak, but the interesting issue is the reason that he gave for allowing them to do so. In the same footnote, of which Ravitch cites the last part, there is a reference to another Dewey article written for the New Republic where I note that Dewey argues against the efficacy of force to remove dissent. Rather he writes: "We recall (from past movements) that such attempts at direct suppression of thought have usually ended by increasing the vitality of obnoxious beliefs...We are surprised that leaders had not enough common sense to allow unpopular ideas to burn themselves out or to die of inanition."[28] And, "What is denied is the efficacy of force to remove disunion of thought and feeling."[29] In this article, the pacificists are only mentioned in passing (they are not the focus of Dewey's remarks) along with other dissenters, but there is little doubt that Dewey's argument for free speech at this point rests upon what he believes is necessary for the prosecution of the war. What Ravitch fails to address when she confuses my statement about the moral prophet with her own interpretation of that statement (as an accusation that Dewey was attempting to silence the moral prophet) is that arguments for free speech generally have not been made on grounds

of efficacy. Dewey's argument here is far removed from those which, for example, see freedom of speech as a prerequisite for truth, or as part of the inherent right of human beings.

Ravitch's failure to notice as significant Dewey's rationale for allowing the pacificists and other dissenters to speak reveals what I believe is a major difference between our two interpretations of Dewey. It also points out different ways of approaching historical events. Ravitch lets stand the argument that Dewey enunciates on the basis of efficacy. Her interest lies in the fact that Dewey supported the freedom of the pacificists to speak and she wants this fact to stand for itself. My concern, however, was to highlight the reasons on which Dewey based his argument, and then, in the context of the larger discussion on manipulation, to subject these reasons to scrutiny. Had Ravitch approached her task without distorting elements in my book, and had she also revealed the different standpoints of analysis in a reasonable way, there would be little question that her interest would have been a legitimate one. For if we are concerned only to appraise Dewey and his work in the context of his own times, then it is certainly important to know where he stood on such vital issues as free speech. Given this objective one may even wish to claim that the fact that someone supported such important values, in the context of perhaps great pressure to do otherwise, is more important than the reasons that were given for that support. (This

would be a controversial claim, but not obviously unreasonable.) To make this kind of analysis in Dewey's case would then lead one to look at the different pressures and views expressed during the war.

Yet this kind of analysis is addressed to the question of a person's character, not to an examination of the reasons that a person may have given for a particular activity. However the reasons may endure long after the event or its agent, and therefore are important in their own right.

The difference that these two perspectives hold for both the analysis and interpretation of a work can be seen in two similar passages, one by Ravitch, the other found in Reason and Rhetoric. Each addresses the relation of liberal progressive technology. Ravitch writes:

> Feinberg does not explain how Dewey or Counts might have convinced the industrialists to diminish their commitment to technology...If Dewey and Counts and other progressives failed to question the rapid advance of technology and failed to understand how it would eventually affect American society, it may be that they were dazzled by technology's promise to improve the quality of life for the masses of people, to eliminate starvation, and to cure disease... Doubtless the modernization process would have gone forward even if Dewey and Counts had never lived...It is questionable whether a thoroughly radicalized, thoroughly Marxist Dewey and Counts would have had much impact at all on a society that was unreceptive to radical thought.[30]

The first of the points that Ravitch makes in this paragraph is a reflection of an almost identical point that I made in Reason and Rhetoric, although the subsequent development of this point is significantly different. In assessing the view of progress held by Beard and Robinson I wrote:

> While they clearly envisaged an eventual end to the traditional ills of man, such as hunger, disease, and inadequate shelter, they address the issue primarily as one of industrial growth and development,[31] not in terms of a standard of distribution.

The difference here is simply that Ravitch's concern seems to be to address the personal reasons why mistakes were made (e.g., they were dazzled by the promise of technology, or they wanted to be effective) whereas I was mainly concerned to understand what the nature of those mistakes was (i.e., what the progressives failed to see while they were dazzled, or what concerns their desire for effectiveness brought them to minimize or overlook).

Neither Ravitch's concern or mine strikes me as unreasonable research programs, and some of the perspective Ravitch expresses was already incorporated into the larger thrust of Reason and Rhetoric. What is surprising is that Ravitch, in a way similar to her treatment of black "progress", is unable to report on the program in Reason and Rhetoric without significantly distorting it. This distortion suggests that there is really a much larger issue contained in this debate, one that speaks to the symbolic significance of Dewey.

III. Conclusion

It would be unfortunate if the evaluation of Dewey's system ultimately rested on the kind of oversights that are represented by Ravitch's treatment. One might argue a better case by suggesting that the problems that Dewey was

attempting to address were, at least in some respects, unique to his own times, and that the uniqueness of such problems needs to be considered in appraising his work. The fact that our problems are somewhat different than those that Dewey faced neither gives us license to ignore the fact that Dewey was addressing problems at a different stage of development, nor does it allow us to neglect the inadequacies of the liberal ideal itself. Moreover, if it is the case that the criticism of liberal society that is offered in Reason and Rhetoric has a certain force which it might not have had during the time that Dewey was writing, it is important to remember that this is so at least in part because of events that, while available to us, were not available to Dewey or to his contemporaries. Dewey was not "privileged" to see the immoral slaughter of Vietnam nor was he witness to the level of police surveillance revealed by Watergate. These events, along with the spectre of nuclear destruction and depleted energy reserves, altered the perceptions of a generation and now place the whole idea of progress in question.

While the introduction to Reason and Rhetoric was framed with the above considerations in mind, it was largely neglected by Ravitch and others. To some extent this can be understood because many were reading it as a book on Dewey when in fact it was a book on liberal educational policy which simply acknowledged Dewey's important formative role. Yet much of the criticism of the book has been based on this reading and it will be useful to conclude by trying to understand the impulse that lies behind it.

One criticism that has been made by a different critic is that in my treatment of Dewey's activity I did not take into account the flux of events that was propelling Dewey into action.[32] What I believe is being suggested here is the fact that the analysis of both a philosopher's system and his practical activity are sensitive tasks which need to be kept somewhat distinct from one another. At the very most a philosophical system can serve as a long-range guide for ordering our thoughts about social and political affairs, whereas the practical acts of everyday life need to contend with contingencies that no system, however comprehensive, is able to anticipate. Thus while a philosophical system is best judged in terms of traditional criteria of philosophical adequacy, such as consistency, coherence and comprehensiveness, a practical action must be judged in terms of what the possibilities were, given a specific set of events.

When this criticism is restated in this way it makes some sense to me and avoids the obvious problem with the earlier formuation, i.e., that the "flux of events" can be used to justify just about any expedient act. What the criticism points to is the fact that a critical analysis of a tradition must be able to discriminate between progressive and retrogressive aspects, and therefore must be able to make its judgments in terms of both the objective conditions and the counter-possibilities that were available at the time that specific actions were taken. Yet there is another side to these remarks which also needs to be con-

sidered. To see this side, it will be useful to turn to another review of Reason and Rhetoric.

Wayne Urban criticizes me for treating Dewey's support of World War I while failing to mention Dewey's early opposition to the Second World War.[33] This criticism puzzled me for a long time not only because Dewey's opposition was very short lived, but also because, given the nature of that war, I saw little to criticize in the fact that Dewey eventually supported this war. Yet there is more to this event than the simple fact of Dewey's support for the war. For along with this support came a set of reasons which were supposed to help us understand the war. The most prominent of these was the new introduction to German Philosophy and Politics published in 1942 where Dewey attempted to establish a link between Hitler's policies and the German tradition of philosophy. Yet insofar as Dewey's reasons are inadequate (failing, for example, to examine the link between the depression and the war, or failing to see the relationship between expanding capital and military activity), and even if the inadequacies were to be understood in terms of overriding factors, they could be challenged independently of our approval or disapproval of his support for the war itself.

Dewey's support for the Second World War is a useful example to help us understand the kinds of questions that need to be taken into account in assessing liberal theory and practice. One may, for example, wish to argue that

Dewey's alternatives were restricted during the Second World War, and that the most reasonable thing that he could do was to support it in the way that he did. Whichever way the analysis goes, however, it will depend upon an evaluation of concrete events and specific alternatives. Yet as a philosopher and a social theorist, Dewey was not just an agent in the social world, he was also involved in reflection about the nature of the world. The product of this reflection is contained not only in his technical and theoretical formulations, but also in the traces of his agency that remain with us in the documents that explain and justify his practical acts. To the extent that these traces clarify the implications of the technical formulations they are useful for a fuller analysis of Dewey's ideas. Furthermore, because those ideas have had a formative influence on our own thoughts about fundamental educational values, then they are a useful place to join a critique of contemporary social and educational life. It is precisely the need for such a critique which Ravitch overlooks.

FOOTNOTES

1. Diane Ravitch, The Revisionists Revised: A Critique of The Radical Attack on the Schools, N.Y.: Basic Books, 1978, p. 105. The footnote in the original academy monograph referred to the wrong page in the Census Bureau report, but this was later corrected by Ravitch in the Basic Books publication. In this paper footnote citations refer to the Basic Books publication unless otherwise indicated.

2. Ibid., p. 112.

3. Ibid., p. 112.

4. See Bureau of the Census/U.S. Department of Commerce, The Social and Economic Status of the Black Population in the United States: An Historical View, 1970-1978. Series P-23, No. 80. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, (n.d), p. 42, Table 26.

5. Ibid., p. 27.

6. Bureau of the Census/U.S. Department of Commerce, The Social and Economic Status of the Black Population in the United States, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974, p. 37, Table 19.

7. Reynold Farley, "Trends in Racial Inequalities: Have the Gains of the 1960s Disappeared in the 1970s?" American Sociological Review, Vol. 42, No. 3, April, 1977, p. 199. The comparable rate for whites during the same period was 90% in 1960, 85% in 1975. It is worth noting too that the percentage of female headed households has increased for Blacks from 22% in 1960 to 33% in 1972. See S. Levitan, W. Johnston and R. Taggart, Still a Dream: The Changing Status of Blacks Since 1960, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975, p. 20. I am indebted to Eric Bredo for bringing Farley's essay to my attention.

8. Bureau of the Census/U.S. Department of Commerce, 1974, p. 30.

9. Ibid., p. 25, Table 9.

10. Farley, p. 198, Table 2. The 1975 figure of $8,779 is still however, slightly below the 1972 figure of $8,831.

11. See Bureau of the Census/U.S. Department of Commerce, 1974, p. 65, Table 39.

12. See Ibid., P. 126, Table 84.

13. Ibid., p. 123, Table 81.

14. Farley, P. 206. The complexity of this issue reveals an interesting problem about traditional social science quantitative research. Since the 1960's there seems to have been an almost consistent increase in the occupational prestige scores of both male and female non-whites at both the first and third quartiles of the population. (See Ibid., p. 197). Yet during the 1970's while this increase was generally continuing, dipping slightly for third quartile non-white males around 1975, unemployment was increasing from 4 to 13 percent among non-white men between 1969 and 1975. (Ibid., p. 193). Now one conclusion which could be drawn from these two sets of figures is that while the situation is improving for those who are able to obtain employment, it is getting increasingly more difficult for people to be employed. Hence the gap between the least well off and everyone else is increasing. While this conclusion seems to me to be the most reasonable one to draw, it does depend upon what certain categories are taken to mean when used to describe why people are unemployed. Another possible interpretation is offered by the author of the American Sociological Review article when he writes:

> Since 1967, the Bureau of Labor statistics has tabulated the activites of persons not on the labor force. They are classified as keeping a home, going to school, unable to work or not working for "other reasons." If the lack of economic opportunities accounts for the decreasing proportion of non-White men at work, we would anticipate that a growing proportion of non-White men would not be in the labor force because of "other reasons" but the data are not consistent with this speculation. In the 1970's there has not been a sharp increase in the proportion who are not in the labor force because of "other reasons." Rather there has been a modest rise in the proportion in this category, as well as increases in the proportion unable to work or going to school. (Ibid., p. 196).

However, from the information that is provided here it is really impossible to draw any conclusions. We do not know, for example, how the Bureau of Labor tabulates the activities. It makes a difference, for example, whether they use some independent data, or whether people are simply asked. If, for example, people are asked, then someone responding "unable to work" could clearly have in mind "unable to find a job." Since Farley wrote this, the unemployment rate for blacks hit a high of 14.5%, the highest rate since the end of World War II. (See The New York Times, Sunday, September 4, 1977, E5.)

15. Bureau of the Census/U.S. Department of Commerce, 1974, p. 52.

16. See Ravitch, p. 103.

17. See my Reason and Rhetoric, Ch 6 and also my "Essay Review of Dewey in China" Philosophy East and West. Winter, 1975.

18. For a more detailed discussion of this issue see my introduction to Equality and Social Policy, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1978. It should not be thought that large amounts of inequality are restricted to the United States. In discussing the question of equality of educational opportunity in Western Europe, for example, Henry Levin argues that there is little evidence that the gaps have decreased. Moreover, given certain structural considerations along with a reduction in economic growth, there is little reason to believe that these gaps will be reduced in the near future. See Henry M. Levin, "Educational Opportunity and Social Inequality in Western Europe," Social Problems, Vol.24, No. 2, December, 1976. In the Basic Books publication, Ravitch deals briefly with the issue of equality and claims that more equality means more bureaucracy, less liberty, less efficiency and less initiative. She does not, however provide any evidence to support these claims. Even more striking, however, is her assertion that "every transfer program is an effort to redress inequalities" (p. 98). She mentions welfare and public housing among other examples but fails to mention government subsidies to upper middle class college students in public institutions, special loans to major corporations, e.g., Lockheed, or property tax write-offs to construction projects undertaken by big business. Yet as Noam Chomsky writes:

> There may be a residual sense to the notion that the state serves as an equalizer, in that without its intervention the destructive forces of capitalism would demolish social existance and the physical environment.

(See Noam Chomsky, "Language, Intelligence and Social Organization," in W. Feinberg, (ed.) Equality and Social Policy, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1978.)

19. See Reason and Rhetoric, "Introduction".

20. Ravitch, p. 139. The appropriate page reference in the publication by the National Academy of Education is pp.52-53.

21. See Ronald Goodenow, "The Paradox of Being Progressive," Change, April, 1976, p. 57, for a more favorable review which, in contrast to Ravitch sees my failure to ex-

amine the class origins of the progressives to be a deficiency.

22. For some of my comments on this point see my "Revisionist Scholarship and the Problem of Historical Context," Teachers' College Record, Vol. 78, No. 3, Feb. 1977.

23. Reason and Rhetoric, pp. 110-111.

24. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, New York: Seabury Press, 1975, p. 17.

25. Ravitch quoting Feinberg quoting Dewey: Ravitch, p. 140.

26. Ravitch, p. 140.

27. John Dewey, "Conscience and Compulsion," The New Republic, July 14, 1917, No. 1719, p. 298.

28. John Dewey, "Conscription of Thought," The New Republic, September 1, 1917, No. 1719, p. 129, parenthesis added.

29. Ibid., p. 128.

30. Ravitch, p. 141. It should be mentioned that Ravitch just assumes American society has been unreceptive to radical thought without mentioning the state power that at various times has been used to suppress it. The Palmer raids, the McCarthy era as well as more recently Jackson State and Kent State would be interesting studies for their influence on radical movements.

31. Reason and Rhetoric, p. 192.

32. See Walter Feinberg, "On Reading Dewey," History of Education Quarterly, Winter, 1975, pp. 395-415, for a more detailed response.

33. Wayne J. Urban, Review, Harvard Educational Review, Vol. 45, No. 4, Nov. 1975, p. 555. Urban's main complaint is with my historical scholarship, but there are a number of times when he misses the drift of the argument and the point that is being made, as is the case with my treatment of Dewey and the First World War. However, there is one observation that he does make which suggests to me that I failed to provide a needed distinction in one of the chapters. Urban, while neglecting a number of my qualifications, gives a reasonably accurate exposition of a point made in one of the chapters. He writes:

> Child-centered reform, Feinberg argues, is emphasized when social tensions are domestic in origin, while subject-matter reform comes to the fore during periods of external threat. He cites the child-centered schooling of the 1920's and 1930's and the life adjustment movement of the 1940's as examples of the former, and refers to the social-efficiency movement during World War I and the Cold Was emphasis on subject matter as instances of the latter. But he overlooks the fact that contrary to his theory, there was no impetus for subject-matter reform during World War II, a time of obvious external threat.

Urban's counter example is questionable here. Cremin, one of the leading historians of the progressive movement, for example, cites as typical of the attacks launched on progressive education shortly before the war two articles (both published in 1940) which criticized it for having no common body of knowledge or moral and intellectual discipline. (See Lawrence A. Cremin, The Transformation of the School: Progressivism in American Education, 1876-1957, New York: Vintage Books, 1961, pp. 325-326.) Nevertheless, while progressive education did undergo serious criticism during this time, Urban is correct; the question is not completely settled whether this criticism was calling for more rigorous teaching of academic subject matter or simply for more behavioural discipline regardless of the subject matter. It is best therefore to leave this an open question for historians to debate. The more general point of the chapter remains, however, that by and large schools have supported that social order, often serving to reinforce the power relationships that are found in the larger society. There is a problem with this chapter that I believe Urban is picking up in his criticism however. The problem relates to a distinction which I made, but failed to make completely. For in discussing pedagogical questions it is useful to make a tentative distinction between the type of curriculum that is being stressed at a particular time and the kind of method that is being used to convey this curriculum. In the book, I mentioned that a child-centered pedagogy, for example, could be attached to an academic curriculum, as I believe it was in many middle class schools in the 1930's, or it may be attached to a kind of life adjustment curriculum, as happened in many working class schools during the 1940's. I should have said the same thing about what I called the subject matter approach to education. That is, a method that emphasizes external discipline and control may be attached to an academic subject matter, but it may also be attached to another kind--say a vocational one. When Urban suggests that there was no impetus for subject matter reform during the war, I suspect that what he means is that there was no impetus for more stress on academic programs (a question which, as I mentioned, is still an

open one). What I think is less likely here is that there was not a greater call for programs that stressed the need for externally imposed discipline.

While Urban's critique is generally a balanced and reasonable one, there are still some problems that I want to mention. The first one may seem somewhat minor, but it provides a distorted exposition of the text. He writes as follows:

> Feinberg's purpose is to show that progressives could not achieve their liberating and democratizing goals because they subscribed to what he sees as the liberals' faith in technology. For instance, by trusting in the fairness of the IQ tests, progressives who supported equal educational opportunity legitimized a principle of unequal educational rewards. (Urban, p. 555).

Now the first part of this statement is an accurate reflection of what I was attempting to show, and Urban does not stretch this as some critics have done to the ridiculous point that I was arguing that progressives should have attempted to abolish technology per se. However, the second part of the passage entails a somewhat inaccurate portrayal both of progressives and of my treatment of them. There were a significant number of progressives who opposed the idea of IQ examinations. Walter Lippmann and John Dewey were two of them. In many respects their arguments were both strong and persuasive, and I think that I clearly reflected this in the book. Where they fell short, obviously so with Lippmann and more subtly so with Dewey, was in their general acceptance of the contours of the existing or developing division of labor, and in the idea explicitly stated by Lippmann that such exams were not the best means for servicing this division. Returning to Urban's treatment of my examination of Dewey's activites during the First World War, he writes:

> Feinberg's liabilities as a historian also undermines his discussion of Dewey. First, he does not allow for change in Dewey's views over time. He cites Dewey's support of World War I as an example of the progressive tendency to allow political pragmatism to supercede the pacifism dictated by individual conscience, but he ignores Dewey's opposition to American involvement in World War II. (Ibid., p. 556).

The issue here is somewhat more complicated than the passage from Urban suggests. Yet to reveal these complications can help provide an understanding of how Urban is reading the book and how his reading of it differs from my intent

in writing it. Urban is correct about two things. First, Dewey did, at least for a short period of time prior to the Second World War, oppose any involvement of the United States in it. (See for example John Dewey, "No Matter What Happens--Stay Out!" Common Sense, March, 1939, VII, iii, II.) And second, Urban is correct in noting that I did not comment on this opposition in the book. What is in question therefore is the significance of this omission, and here Urban misses a number of important considerations. First, Dewey's opposition to the Second World War seems to have been short lived and by 1942 the U.S. Army Air Force appears to have been dropping propoganda leaflets written by Dewey over China. (See "An Open Letter to the Chinese People," Washington: Office of War Information, 1942, as reproted in Milton H. Thomas, John Dewey: A Centennial Bibliography, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1962, p. 137). Ultimately Dewey supported the Second World War as well as the first one. Urban, however, overlooked this fact. A second reason for not mentioning Dewey's thoughts about the Second World War is that his writings on this subject are rather slim, and do little to illuminate some of his fundamental concerns. Indeed, I found it strikingly odd that Urban mentions Dewey's opposition as if it were something which would cast the philosopher in a more favorable light. Nor do I think that his eventual support for the war should be thought to detract from an evaluation of his work. Given the differences in circumstances I am not quite as certain that this would hold true for Dewey's support of the First World War. However, this is an arguable position, and what Urban apparently misses is the fact that my examination of Dewey's activities during the First World War was designed not to show that he supported the war, but to try to clarify some of his broader principles by showing how they were articulated in terms that related to everyday practice. Thus, for example, my treatment of the Polish Study was intended primarily to clarify certain ambiguities in Dewey's more abstract notion of cultural pluralism, while the treatment of pacificists, which Urban mentions, was intended to show (albeit, the reference occurs in a brief footnote) how essentially moral concerns tended to be reduced to technical and engineering problems, and hence dismissed.

The Great School Warriors:

A Review of Diane Ravitch's The Revisionists Revised*

by

Harvey Kantor

The last decade produced a major challenge to the traditional interpretation of America's educational past. Rejecting the standard portrait which linked the growth of public schooling with the evolution of American democracy, a group of educational historians, philosophers, and economists--generally labeled revisionists--argued that beneath the rhetoric of democracy and opportunity, elites and their allies (professional educators and middle class reformers) shaped educational institutions to advance their class interest and preserve the class structure of American society. In two path breaking books--The Irony of Early School Reform and Class, Bureaucracy, and Schools--Michael Katz asserted that schools were racist, class-biased bureaucracies imposed on American society by ruling elites interested in preserving their social and economic dominance.[1] Clarence Karier, Paul Violas, Joel Spring and others extended this theme arguing that the history of schooling in the twentieth century has reflected the agenda of corporate liberals interested in using schools to assure social stability and to fit people to the economic and social demands of a corporate society.[2] And, most recently, economists Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis used some of this evidence to

* Originally published in Social Policy 9 (March/April, 1979): 54-58.

develop a systematic neo-Marxist analysis which asserts that the expansion of public schooling has functioned to integrate workers into the capitalist division of labor and to reproduce the class structure from one generation to the next.[3]

The Revisionists Revised by Diane Ravitch is a biting, often polemical attack on this body of scholarship. Charging that radical scholars tell an overly pessimistic and often incorrect story, Ravitch seeks to re-assert the liberal belief in the democratic character of American schooling and to reclaim the educational past from radical critics. At her best she offers a penetrating critique of flaws in radical scholarship, but at her worst--and the bad outweighs the good--she is open to many of the same criticisms which she directs at her radical adversaries.

According to Ravitch, revisionist scholarship suffers from four major defects. First, she charges that revisionist work is overly reductionist and deterministic, for it draws conclusions about people and events on the basis of the assumed imperatives of social class. This assumption, she argues, is an insufficient explanation for action and is no substitute for rigorous historical analysis. Business people, educators, and reformers, she points out, were not often all of one mind about educational issues. In particular, progressive educational reformers such as John Dewey and Jane Addams need to be differentiated from business elites also involved in educational reform.

Second, Ravitch asserts that radical educational history

is present-minded; that is, it seeks the roots of today's evils in events which occured over a century ago. Consequently, revisionist work confuses intentions with outcomes and ignores the fact that the consequences of a particular action cannot always be fully anticipated or controlled. Searching for the clue to educational history in the sinister motives of educators and elites, radical historians--particularly Karier and Violas--have spent a great deal of time examining reformers' rhetoric, but have generally failed to examine the "actual" effects of particular policies. Vocational education, she points out, is an issue about which far more is known about stated intentions than actual outcomes.

Third, she argues that revisionist scholars oversimplify the relationship between organizational structure-- i.e., bureaucracy--and institutional purpose by reducing the complex workings of institutions to deterministic generalizations. Bureaucratic institutions, she argues, are not "bourgeois institutions" designed to repress working people as Michael Katz contends, but are responses to the complexities of urbanization, modernization, and population growth. Besides, she adds, bureaucratic organizations are not unique to capitalist societies but exist in socialist societies as well.

Finally, she argues that the portrait of elite domination of educational history distorts the complex, diverse reactions of working people, immigrants, and Blacks many of whom resisted Americanization but struggled to provide additional educational resources for their children. Rather than treat working people as passive objects of elite manipulation, she suggests, we should recognize that immigrants, minorities, and others often hoped to enter the mainstream of American life and pursued

education as the best way to fulfill those desires.

Much of this criticism rings true. At its worst, revisionist work tends toward reductionism, presentism, and an oversimplified determinism (as does the worst liberal scholarship). Her call for educational historians to acknowledge the complexity of historical causation, to consider the diverse interests and goals of reformers, to examine carefully the twisted course of historical events, and to pay more attention to outcomes than to the rhetoric of intentions should not be debated by any serious scholar. So, too, historical work in education needs to pay close attention to the complex often diverse attitudes of working people toward the institutional forces which impinged on their lives. Indeed, revisionist work in education has at times substituted a homogenized and abstract view of workers for a more complex portrait of the varied experiences and aspirations of immigrants, Blacks, and other minorities. As Herbert Gutman has pointed out, however, American workers in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries did not veiw their changing circumstances in simple 'economic' terms. Rather, their behavior often reflected the interaction of their culture of origin, their class outlook, and the particular institution they encountered.[4]

If this were the full extent of Ravitch's critique, one would have little reason to quarrel with The Revisionists Revised. But this is not the entire scope of her attack. For, while offering these often astute judgments, she also seriously distorts much of radical scholarship (particularly the work of Bowles and Gintis), implies that revisionist scholars are not asking worthwhile questions, and, most im-

portantly, relies on her own bland version of liberal ideology in place of any realistic historical analysis.

Part of her problem is that the revisionists, as she acknowledges, are a remarkably diverse group. Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis are economists, Walter Feinberg is a philosopher, and the historians--Katz, Karier, Violas, and Spring-- widely in their interests and modes of analysis. For example, where Katz

tury, Karier and Spring focus on the first years of the twentieth; where Katz generally argues that ideology is merely a cloak for self-interest, Karier and Spring contend that ideology is central to an understanding of reformers' intentions. Moreover, where Karier and Violas share an interest in the motivation of historical actors, Bowles and Gintis are less interested in intent than in the outcome of educational decisions. What they share nonetheless, Ravitch argues, is an antagonism to liberal reform and a belief that education has perpetuated rather than alleviated economic inequality.

Yet, failure to appreciate these distinctions leads Ravitch to serious distortions, particularly with regard to Bowles and Gintis. For example, where she contends that radical scholars have embarked on a simple-minded search for evil intentions, Bowles and Gintis readily acknowledge the good intentions of progressive reformers such as Dewey and Addams. Indeed, they lament the fact that Dewey's educational aims were not realized. Moreover, Bowles and Gintis explicitly acknowledge the influence of pluralist politics on educational decisions. In a number of areas, they point out--school board decisions, student's course selection,

bond referenda--pluralist forces shaped the course of daily events. What they do assert however, which Ravitch utterly fails to comprehend, is that reformers and others (well-intentioned or otherwise) operated within a social structure defined by capitalist social relations and ideology. Consequently, they argue that while the day-to-day operations of schooling often reinforced an image of pluralist politics, the results of those decisions bolstered the capitalist class system. Indeed, they suggest, under ideal conditions of hegemony, elites do not need to participate in daily decision making, provided that educational decisions remain within boundaries acceptable to the basic structure of capitalist society.

Whether one agrees with this analysis or not, it certainly is a gross distortion to charge that Bowles and Gintis are searching for evil, sinister intentions, blaming progressive reformers for educational inequality, or presenting a simple, reductionist argument for the expansion of schooling. In fact, Ravitch so misunderstands their thesis that her general criticism of their work is basically that things aren't much better in the socialist countries of eastern Europe. Yet even here she errs, for Bowles and Gintis do not look to eastern Europe for model societies, but explicitly point out that "the state socialist countries of Eastern Europe were never democratic" and that ruling elites in those societies "have always maintained their power through top-down control of production, a centralized party structure, and the military."[5]

More serious that these distortions is Ravitch's implication that revisionist scholars are not asking worthwhile

questions. For instance, she implies that the relationship between bureaucracy and class is spurious. Bureaucracy, she argues, is an inevitable result of modernization, not a form of class rule. Yet, aside from the fact that she mis-reads Michael Katz (who argues that structure and purpose interacted, not that structure is reducible to class), a number of other scholars including Marvin Lazerson, Carl Kaestle, and David Tyack (who also pursue revisionist themes, though quoted by Ravitch in defense of her assertions) also suggest that bureaucracy and class purpose were closely related. Examining the growth of bureaucracy in New York City in the first half of the nineteenth century, for example, Kaestle points out that while bureaucratic structures grew piecemeal in response to the challenge of administering ever greater numbers of schools and students, they also reinforced the aims of elites interested in using schools to preserve their moral and cultural hegemony in a diverse city.[6] Likewise, David Tyack has pointed out that while bureaucratization was partly a response to the complexities of ubanization and population growth, bureaucratic organization was not simply the result of a preordained imperative. Rather, the drive to bureaucratize urban schools, which flowered after 1890 in cities across the nation, was part of an effort by elites and educational professionals to turn political questions into administrative issues by removing decision making from the public arena to the hallways and offices of bureaucratic organizations where educational experts could operate free from the pressures of public opinion.[7]

Ravitch also dismisses questions which revisionists have

raised regarding the nature of Progressive ideology. Revisionists, she argues (particularly Karier, Violas and Feinberg), have selectively quoted Dewey, Addams, and other progressive reformers, painting a dark picture which overlooks their good intentions and fails to appreciate the complexity and diversity of their thought. Yet, a number of other social historians including Robert Wiebe, James Weinstein, and Christopher Lasch have also pointed out that progressive philosophy placed an emphasis on social order, harmony, and control, as well as on individuality, independence and spontaneity.[8] Moreover, as John Higham has commented, progressives of all stripes--social efficiency types, business progressives, welfare reformers, and socialists, too--fell victim to the optimistic belief that social problems were susceptible to technical rather than political solutions.[9] One need not assert bad intentions--as Karier and Violas sometimes seem to do--to point to these flaws in progressive thought. Neither, however, are good intentions--as Ravitch asserts--reason to dismiss consideration of the conformist, coercive aspects of Progressive reform. Rather than argue about motives and intentions, one needs to examine how an actor's historical context defined his/her horizons, not retreating from judgement but distinguishing carefully between one's own value judgements and the actor's world view.

Why does Ravitch fail to acknowledge the historical viability of these issues? Underlying her lack of concern for these questions is a belief that inequality was (and is) not as pronounced as the revisionists maintain, except for native Americans

and Blacks, and that, in any case, achieving a more equal society requires additional bureaucracy which, in her view, is even more objectionable. In support of her latter argument, she simply refers to the example of the Soviet Union and eastern Europe in place of any substantive analysis of American society. To support her former contention, she reviews a number of historical and sociological studies of occupational mobility in the United States in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In brief, she concludes that these studies indicate that: a) there was substantial upward mobility in the United States in the late nineteenth and early part of the twentieth centuries, b) there continues to be substantial occupational mobility in the mid-twentieth century, and c) in the twentieth century, educational attainment has had (and continues to have) an independent effect, apart from social class background, on occupational status.

A review of these diverse studies is not possible here, for a complete evaluation would extend for many pages. But since Ravitch builds much of her argument on their findings, a few brief considerations are in order.[10] First, those studies that find a great deal of occupational mobility for poor and working class people in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries also indicate that elites always retained a distinct occupational advantage. Second, while most historical studies indicate that occupational mobility was not an impossibility for those at the bottom of the economic ladder, they generally conclude that while there was a great amount of mobility (that is perhaps upwards of one-

third of blue collar workers in some communities experienced some occupational mobility), this was over a relatively short distance (that is, a notch or two) on the occupational ladder. Rags to respectability perhaps, rags to riches unlikely. Third, the criterion for mobility in most of these studies is movement from blue to white collar occupations. Yet this is not a very reliable indicator of mobility or class position. Not only, for example, was mid-nineteenth century society characterized by vast disparities of wealth within occupations, as Michael Katz has pointed out, but after 1870 agricultural employment declined and the number of white collar jobs increased rapidly. Thus, movement from blue to white collar work is not a very helpful measure of upward mobility or of one's relative position within the emerging class structure of late nineteenth and early twentieth century American society. Indeed, as E.P. Thompson, Herbert Gutman and others have argued, occupational categories alone (or income categories for that matter) are inadequate indicators of class, for such classifications reduce class to unidimensional sociological variables and overlook the fact that classes have a culture and a history of their own which can only be understood within the context of the class relations of a given society.[11]

These mobility studies, then, do not prove Ravitch's contention that class had been an unimportant barrier to mobility and that class background has been relatively unimportant in determining one's occupational prospects.

Even more important, while these studies provide valuable information about the occupational structure of nineteenth and twentieth century cities, they cannot substitute for analysis of the structure and distribution of economic and political power in American society. Indeed, it is at least plausible to suggest, as David Tyack has noted, that the modest advancement of all is quite compatible with elite dominance. In fact, such advancement may act to de-fuse unrest by convincing many of the open nature of the economic system and the benevolence of ruling elites.[12]

Whatever the case in the second half of the nineteenth and early decades of the twentieth centuries, however, Ravitch asserts that American society in the twentieth century has grown and is growing more and more equal and that the expansion of education--independent of the effects of social class--is a major reason for this. As a result of the Great Society and other liberal reforms, she contends, economic inequality has been substantially reduced, if not through direct income then through transfer payments. Yet a number of studies of the distribution of income in the United States--not to mention the ownership of stocks, bonds, and property--indicate that with only minor fluctuations income distribution has been persistently unequal since 1910--the top twenty per cent receiving less than 10%.[13] And, while food stamps, welfare payments, medicare, and other social programs certainly ameliorate the effects of dire poverty, they hardly equalize the quality of life, distribution of power and status, or relative freedom

for groups at the bottom of American society.

Moreover, the fact that education has an independent effect on occupational status apart from social class background is not surprising, for in a society which guards access to high status jobs through educational requirements, rich and poor alike must attain the required credentials in order to qualify for entry to the most prestigious occupations. Thus, for example, a poor child with a lot of education probably will have better occupational opportunities than a middle class child with low levels of education. (Class is not the only consideration, of course; the effect of education on occupation also varies with race and sex.) The real question, then, becomes who gets how much and what type of education and why. And, though educational inequality is not nearly as pronounced as economic inequality, studies such as Jencks', whom she refers to in support of her argument regarding the independent effect of education on occupational achievement, suggest that social class plays an important role in determining the level of educational attainment.[14]

To be sure, one must admire Ravitch's re-assertion that education makes a difference to one's life chances. In the pessimistic climate of the 1970's it is easy to conclude that education is irrelevant to one's economic prospects. Surely, the United States does need to put more resources into the education of its youth, particularly the education of poor and minority youth. Moreover, as Ravitch points out, revisionist analysis which argues that schools simply reproduce the

class structure does take the ground out from under those who advocate for increased resources for schools. Yet, such an argument is no reason to ignore the vital historical questions asked by revisionists, for it merely substitues a liberal presentism for a radical one.

Ravitch, in the end, is a captive of her own liberal ideology. While she chides revisionists for attributing actions and events to the sinister intentions of liberals, she herself takes their stated intentions as a sufficient explanation of historical events and is too often content to substitute liberal ideology for historical analysis. Thus, she exalts the liberal tradition of compromise and accomodation as the essence of a democratic community but ignores the social and economic structure within which this process occurs as well as the abundant evidence that whatever gains poor and working people have achieved are the result of conflict and struggle not simply the good will of liberal politicians. As a result, she seems to equate capitalism with democracy. Yet, as Charles Lindblom has recently reminded us, although historically linked, capitalism in the twentieth century has become the antithesis of democracy, for through an unprecedented concentration of power, capitalist enterprise has been able to set the boundaries of acceptable political debate and, most importantly, to remove the most basic questions of daily life--how and where one works, what investments will be made, what types of technology will be developed, how the environment will be altered--from public

scrutiny, discussion, and democratic control.[15] De-mystifying this relationship, then, is a central task for all those interested in a more equal and democratic society, but Ravitch's book only contributes to the confusion.

The Revisionists Revised will be welcomed by those made uncomfortable by the issues raised by revisionist scholars as well as by those searching for a lively, political debate. But those people looking for a book which will enrich their understanding of the role of education in American history will be disappointed. For, despite some astute observations, the book is often unfair, at times simply incorrect in its presentation of radical views, and most importantly, I think, can easily be used as a sophisticated rationalization for the inequality which has characterized the history of education as well as other spheres of life in capitalist America.

FOOTNOTES

1. Michael B. Katz, The Irony of Early School Reform, Educational Innovation in Mid-Nineteenth Century Massachusetts (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), and Class, Bureaucracy, and Schools: The Illusion of Educational Change in America (N.Y.: Praeger, 1971).

2. Clarence Karier, Shaping the American Edcational State: 1900 to the Present (N.Y.: Free Press, 1975), Joel Spring, Education and the Rise of the Corporate State (Boston: Beacon, 1973), and Clarence Karier, Paul Violas,and Joel Spring, Roots of Crisis: American Education in the Twentieth Century (Chicago: Rand McNally College Publishing, 1973). Also, see Walter Feinberg and Henry Rosemont, Jr., eds., Work, Technology, and Education, Dissenting Essays in the Intellectual Foundations of American Education (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1976).

3. Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, Schooling in Capitalist America, Educational Reform and the Contradictions of Economic Life (N.Y.: Basic Books, 1976).

4. Herbert G. Gutman, Work, Culture and Society in Industrializing America (N.Y.: Alfred A. Knopf, 1976), esp. chp. 1.

5. Bowles and Gintis, Schooling in Capitalist America, p. 81.

6. Carl F. Kaestle, The Evolution of an Urban School System, New York City, 1750-1850 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973), esp. chps. 4-6.

7. David B. Tyack, The One Best System, A History of American Urban Education (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974), part IV.

8. Robert H. Wiebe, The Search for Order, 1877-1920 (N.Y.: Hill and Wang, 1967), esp. chps. 5-6, James Weinstein, The Corporate Ideal in the Liberal State: 1900-1918 (Boston: Beacon, 1968), and Christopher Lasch, The New Radicalism in America 1889-1963, The Intellectual as a Social Type (N.Y.: Vintage, 1965), esp. chp. 5.

9. John Higham, "Hanging Together: Divergent Unities in American History," The Journal of American History LXI (June, 1974): 5-27.

10. Among the works Ravitch refers to are: Herbert G. Gutman, "The Reality of the Rags to Riches 'Myth': The Case of the Paterson, New Jersey, Locomotive, Iron and Machinery Manufacturers, 1830-1880." in Stephan Thernstrom and Richard Sennett, eds., Nineteenth Century Cities: Essays in the New Urban History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969), pp. 98-124, Clyde Griffen, "Workers Divided: The Effect of Craft and Ethnic Differences in Poughkeepsie, New York, 1850-1880," in Thernstrom and Sennett, eds., Nineteenth Century Cities, pp. 49-97, and Paul B. Worthman, "Working Class Mobility in Birmingham, Alabama 1880-1914," in Tamara K. Hareven, ed., Anonymous Americans, Explorations in Nineteenth Century Social History (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1971. Mostly, however, she relies on, Stephan Thernstrom, The Other Bostonians: Poverty and Progress in the American Metropolis, 1880-1970 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973).

11. E.P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class (New York: Vintage Books, 1966), and Gutman, Work, Culture, and Society, esp. chps. 1-2. Also see, Alan Dawley, Class and Community: The Industrial Revolution in Lynn (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1976), and James A. Henretta, "The Study of Social Mobility: Ideological Assumptions and Conceptual Bias," Labor History 18 (Spring 1977): 165-178.

12. David B. Tyack, "School and Society in St. Louis," History of Education Quarterly 16 (Summer 1976): 199.

13. Robert Lampman, The Share of Top Wealth Holders in National Wealth, 1922-1956 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962): Gabriel Kolko, Wealth and Power in America: An Analysis of Social Class and Income Distribution (New York: Praeger, 1962): G. William Domhoff, Who Rules America? (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967): Frank Ackerman et. al., "The Extent of Income Inequality in the United States," in Richard C. Edwards, Michael Reich, and Thomas Weisskopf, eds., The Capitalist System (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1972), pp. 207-217; Christopher Jencks et. al., Inequality: A Reassessment of the Effect of Family and Schooling in America (New York: Basic Books, 1972), pp. 209-213; and, Lester C. Thurow, "Education and Economic Inequality," The Public Interest 28 (Summer 1972): 66-81. Two periods of increasing income equality in the twentieth century were the Depression and World War II. Depression and war, however, are not policies which recommend themselves.

14. Jencks et.al., Inequality, chp. 6. Also see, Ivar Berg, Education and Jobs: The Great Training Robbery (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), and, for an excellent review of recent

research on education and inequality, Jerome Karabel and A.H. Halsey, "Educational Research: A Review and an Interpretation," in Jerome Karabel and A. H. Halsey, eds., Power and Ideology in Education (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), pp. 1-85.

15. Charles E. Lindblom, Politics and Markets: The World's Political-Economic Systems (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1977).

An Apology for American Educational History*

by

Michael Katz

In The Revisionists Revised, Diane Ravitch argues that through incapacity or political motivation the "revisionist" historians have deployed incomplete evidence, bad logic, and poor theory to present a simple-minded, conspiracy-ridden, and thoroughly negative portrait of America's educational past.[1] Written in the service of un-American political ideals, their work not only has distorted the past but has exacerbated the problems of low morale and declining standards in American education. Ravitch would like to substitute a story of progress, a sustained attempt to realize democratic-liberal aspirations in a pluralistic society. Despite unfortunate lapses, including slavery and McCarthyism, the fundamental openness of society and the steady improvement in the lot of minorities remain indisputable hallmarks of America's past, evidence of the fundamental soundness of American institutions. Progress can be continued through a steady application of the democratic-liberal tradition of reform--in particular of representative rather than participatory democracy.

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Ravitch concentrates her attention on the work of Clarence Karier, Joel Spring, Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, Walter Feinberg, and myself, although she criticizes a number of other writers as well. She begins with an overview of the main issues in the debate, and in the next few chapters attempts to summarize critically the revisionist position. The substantive core of her argument is a discussion of the relation between education and social progress. The book concludes with a chapter whose point is apparent in its title, "A Summing Up: Limitations of the Ideological Approach."

Ravitch notwithstanding, historical scholarship during the last decade has exposed the myths obscuring the origins of public schooling. Public education neither emerged in a blaze of egalitarian and humanitarian zeal nor did it alter patterns of inequality. Rather, the development of public education cannot be understood apart from social relations between classes, anxieties about disorder, attempts to shore up a social structure under stress, and the invention of modern forms of bureaucracy. Diane Ravitch's book does not offer an effective challenge to this perspective. Nonetheless, her book requires a lengthy review because it is representative of the current backlash against dissenting scholarship and social reform. The position outlined in her book should concern those interested in the degree of equity and social justice in American life.

The Revisionists Revised has received a great deal of attention and favorable comment. Too frequently reviewers

have accepted the book's description of "revisionist" scholarship without further scrutiny. Its message is clearly one that many have wanted to hear: radical scholarship has apparently touched exposed nerves. It has called into question the traditional justifications of major social institutions; undercut comfortable notions of the role of disinterested benevolence and humanitarianism in the history of American reform; challenged the design and results of the social programs of the 1960s; and taken a hard, critical look at the vast, self-protective educational establishment. At the same time, the mood of the country has shifted in a more conservative direction, with budget-cutting as the most popular electoral slogan (1978), and a general backlash against radical ideas evident in many quarters. Still, the economy stagnates, inflation increases, and the condition of the cities deteriorates. In these circumstances, myths about the credibility of social institutions and the reality of social progress serve to protect professionals and to bridge the distance between mood and actuality. This is why the times are right for the message offered by Diane Ravitch.

The history of Ravitch's book shows that it is not simply a laudable and straightforward attempt to "contribute to the lively debate that American education needs at all times" (p.xi). In 1975 the National Academy of Education under a grant from the Ford Foundation invited Ravitch to review the literature on the history of American education. The review which resulted has been expanded into the book under consider-

ation here. Copies of the review were sent to the publishers of the historians attacked, to deans of education, and to some professors of education, not all historians. I received copies from my publishers, none directly from the Academy So did most (though not all) of those attacked.

This incident raises troubling questions. Why was Ravitch, rather than one of the more obviously established scholars in the field, selected to write the review in the first place? Second, how was the mailing list for distribution chosen? Why did it go to publishers, deans, and influential professors and not to the authors attacked?

I have attempted to answer these questions about the sponsorship and distribution of Ravitch's review by the National Academy of Education. However, I have received only vague and unhelpful answers from the then president, Patrick Suppes. It remains unclear whether the Academy wished to obtain a general review of the literature in the history of American education or an attack upon the "revisionists."[2]

If the connection between Ravitch and the National Academy has aroused the suspicions of those taken to task by Ravitch, they should be pardoned. For--whatever the motivation behind the incident--a deliberate and well-financed attempt to discredit radical scholarship could not have been initiated more effectively.

Ravitch wishes to do more than discredit revisionist historians. In attempting to substitute a different version of the American past, she has become one of the most articu-

late exponents of what can be called the apologist case for American education, past and present. This review is not the place to systematically present a dissenting view.[3] Rather I wish to concentrate on Ravitch's tactics and on exposing the theoretical weakness at the heart of the apologist version of American history. Although my rebuttal emphasizes some of Ravitch's charges against me and not other historians, her treatment of my work is an example of the way she treats the work of other scholars she attacks in this volume.[4]

Diane Ravitch prefaces her discussion of revisionist historians by noting the curious lack of response to their writings.

> In my own field of educational history, radical historians have encountered very little opposition; even books which, in my view, flagrantly violated the rules of evidence and logic went unchallenged. Scholars who disagreed profoundly chose to look the other way rather than engage in controversy with the radical historians. One prominent historian wrote, in response to an early version of this book, that he agreed with what I had written but had been afraid to state the same things himself; another historian wrote that he now realized that his error in the 1960's was in keeping silent for fear of being shouted down. (p.xi)

Two observations undercut her statement. In fact, each of the works Ravitch attacks has been criticized in reviews and at professional meetings. My first book, The Irony of Early School Reform, for example, received not only praise but sharp criticism during the initial round of reviews, and revisionist scholarship has been enmeshed in controversy for the last decade.[5]

Second, Ravitch's statement implies that the revisionists formed a powerful group, strong enough to silence criticism within the field. However, at the time Irony appeared, I was a twenty-nine-year-old assistant professor; Joel Spring published his first book before he had tenure; and Samuel Bowles suffered professionally for the political stance of his research. The most senior historian among those attacked by Ravitch is Clarence Karier at the University of Illinois. The fact remains that not one major piece of radical educational history has been published by a tenured member of the faculty at Harvard, Chicago, Stanford, or Columbia, the centers of power and prestige among schools of education. Ravitch intimates the existence of a conspiracy of radical historians to silence criticism. It should be obvious that the facts could hardly support such a charge.

Ravitch attempts to construct a group she can term radical revisionists. Although she begins by noting that each historian within the group offers a different interpretation, she generally ignores this caveat and creates the impression of an intellectually and politically unified group. In truth, however, sharp differences of method, interpretation, and politics separate the historians Ravitch attacks, although each in his own way offers a critical version of the past. What Ravitch scarcely mentions is that these historians have been often sharply critical of each other.

Ravitch falsely homogenizes the historians she criticizes into a set of straw men not only by ignoring the differences

and controversies between them but also by distorting their viewpoints and omitting important aspects of their arguments. For instance, she criticizes my analysis in The Irony of Early School Reform of the vote to abolish Beverly High School in 1860 by arguing that I made a simple situation far too complex. She attempts to show that the occupational figures I gave are ambiguous and that the opponents of the school lived far away and had no school-age children: in other words, that the opposition lacked structural roots or a class basis as I contended.

Now, I stated quite clearly that distance from the school and the age of children played important parts in the vote. I also showed that clear differences in wealth, as measured by property value, separated supporters and opponents; that all of the laborers, clearly the lowest occupational group on any social or economic ranking, voted against the high school; and that within both central and peripheral districts, occupation and wealth influenced the way people voted. Ravitch does not cite any of the latter three pieces of evidence, and does not even mention that I considered wealth or had the sense to control for location. She attempts to convey an impression that I was simple-minded, building a case to suit my ideological fancy rather than one based on evidence.[6]

Elsewhere, Ravitch contends that my analysis of bureaucracy is deficient because it merely stresses the relation between organizational structure and class and does not consider the role of objective conditions such as population

pressure or administrative chaos (p. 50). That statement neglects one-third of Class, Bureaucracy, and Schools, the book under attack, which painstakingly describes the development of bureaucracy in one urban school system, an account which stresses both objective conditions and processes. That section of the book is a condensation of a two-part essay which appeared in the History of Education Quarterly, and was an extremely detailed account of the origins of educational bureaucracy. Ravitch does not mention that account, in either its shorter or longer form, despite its centrality to her thesis and her critique.[7]

Not only does Ravitch omit inconvenient aspects of the work she criticizes, she also neglects the revisionists' attempts to grapple with critics, to refine interpretations, or to utilize new historiographical techniques for which she praises others. Her criticism does not mention my attempt to answer other critics in the epilogue to the expanded edition of Class, Bureaucracy, and Schools; my effort to synthesize recent sholarship in "The Origins of Public Education: A Reassessment," or my work on family and social structure in The People of Hamilton. This study contains as detailed an empirical investigation of social mobility as any she uses to support her thesis about the openness of American society.[8]

Ravitch states (p. 117) that I argue "that the irony of mid-nineteenth-century school reform is that it was not the product of working-class demands, but rather that it was

imposed." That, to set the record straight, is not the irony. Irony means unintended outcome, and the principal one in my book is the discrepancy between the intention and results of educational innovation, a point made clearly in the text. Elsewhere (p. 122), Ravitch states that I imply "that tax funds should be spent only on services used by each segment of the community in proportion to its numbers," a point I never made or implied. On page 125, she asserts that I assume "the goals of educational radicals and working-class parents are the same." In fact, I make exactly the opposite point and discuss the dilemma that arises from the contradiction between the two.

Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis's work also suffers from Ravitch's omissions. She does not mention that a substantial portion of their book, Schooling in Capitalist America, rests upon a sophisticated multivariate analysis whose nature and conclusions undercut her criticisms.[9] Ravitch presents Bowles and Gintis' thesis as simply one more discovery of the relation between family background and educational achievement (p. 149). She does not mention that their case is arresting and compelling because it demonstrates that, with controls for socioeconomic background, IQ has relatively little independent effect upon income inequality. In other words, by its own standards the meritocracy is a failure. To dismiss Bowles and Gintis' careful and complex analysis of the relations between measured IQ, socioeconomic background,

and education, and their tightly argued account of the contradictions between socialization and schooling as "nothing more that speculation masquerading as sociology" (pp.150-151) is to caricature an important piece of serious, imaginative scholarship.

Ravitch not only omits, she also distorts and invents. Consider the following sentence: "A decent respect for the complexity of causation will make the historian reluctant to claim that the activites of an insitution in the mid-twentieth century were directly determined by the ideas of a man who was influential in 1850" (p. 46). That of course is true, but none of the historians she attacks has argued to the contrary. Nor is there any basis whatsoever for this assertion: "The radical historian describes the terrible way things turned out and asserts that it must have been intended by policymakers" (p. 44). Similarly, she writes, with reference to the diversity of American minorities, "It is historically unjustified to assert that all have been crushed by their education or by the public schools into a homogeneous, deracinated mass" (p. 58). Certainly, but none of the historians she attacks has said that, and she provides no evidence for her point, nor could she. Or, "as they (radical revisionists) contend, only those from high-status families do well in school, so the injustice of the social order is reproduced and perpetuated through the myth and mechanism of the public school" (p. 73). Again, none of the historians in question have said any such things.

It is curious that a book which attacks a group of authors for their ideological distortions should bear such a tenuous relation to what they actually have written. Indeed, Ravitch's tactics are precisely those of which she accuses the radical revisionists: omission, distortion, the creation of straw men, ideological bias, and unjust and unwarranted impeachment of motive. Consider for a moment the question of motives. Although she deprecates what she unjustly takes to be an attack on the motives of educational reformers, Ravitch assaults the motives of the revisionists. Referring to Bowles and Gintis, she states "one might wish that the authors showed some slight appreciation for the democratic-liberal values that preserve their freedom to publish a call to revolution against democratic liberalism" (p. 154). However, a central premise of Bowles and Gintis's work is that a contradiction exists between the democratic character of the political process and the hierarchical organization of economic life. Contrary to what Ravitch would have readers believe, they define socialism "as an extension of democracy from the narrowly political to the economic realm" (p. 14). Her remark is a slur against two scholars whose commitment to academic freedom, democracy, and intellectual dialogue has pervaded their published work and their lives.

The direct questioning of Clarence Karier's integrity also must be noted. In The Shaping of the American Educational State, Clarence Karier reproduced Walter Lippman's criticism of intelligence testing which first appeared in the New

Republic shortly before that journal published articles on the same topic by John Dewey.[10] Karier did not reprint Dewey's contribution. Although it is rare to encounter an anthology designed as a text that reprints every article relevant to a topic, Ravitch nonetheless asserts: "The only conceivable reason for leaving them out is that they constitute a sharp refutation of many of the allegations Karier has made against Dewey. . . . To have included Dewey's penetrating critique of testing would have compelled Karier to deal with complexity, for he would have found himself agreeing with one of his chief targets." (p. 136).

One might reach exactly the same conclusion about Ravitch because when she agrees with a point made by the revisionist historians, she often presents it without acknowledgement, as her own. For example, at the close of her book Ravitch cautions against unrealistically expecting schools to solve social and economic problems which "might be more directly and fruitfully attacked in noneducational ways" (p. 173). An excellent point, which many of those she criticizes have been making in print for a decade, and which is included in my work which Ravitch has attacked.[11]

Simplistic reductionist assumptions exemplify Ravitch's discussion of social theory. Much of her apologist case for American social institutions is cast in windy terms and resembles nothing so much as a ninth-grade civics textbook. Consider, for example, the following paragraph:

> The focus of democratic thought in the United States has traditionally been a commitment to the democratic political process, a belief in the doctrine of majority rule and minority rights. Compromise and conciliation are vital elements in the democratic process....The process works slowly and unevenly, and it occasionally errs; sometimes the majority is wrong, and sometimes the necessity for conciliation defers needed social change. The major political parties support the process, regardless of who wins elections or legislative votes, because it guarantees their own ability to win some future vote, and with it, the cooperation of the loser. (p. 34)

Harmless enough, if vacuous. Less benign is her sharp distinction between representative and participatory democarcy, seeing only the former as in the American liberal tradition. Advocating participatory democracy "puts the educational radical at odds with the mainstream of liberalism" (p. 126). Ravitch's animosity towards decentralization and the dispersal of power underlies not only her critique of the revisionists but is also the hidden agenda of The Great School Wars, which is a thinly veiled attack upon decentralization efforts in the New York City schools from the early nineteenth century until the present.[12]

Ravitch is entitled to her point of view, but two observations must be made. First, hers is a strange position for one whose heroes and heroines include John Dewey and Jane Addams, both of whom attempted to demonstrate the centrality of process to democracy. It was, after all, Jane Addams' famous observation "unless all men and all classes contribute to a good, we cannot even be sure that it is worth having"--that most simply and eloquently states the assumption on which

efforts to make democracy more participatory have rested. Ravitch cannot have it both ways.[13]

Second, Ravitch fails to acknowledge that a bias shapes her history as surely as it affects the interpretations she criticizes and, indeed, all written history. She locates the positions she contests as outside the American tradition and hence, by implication, alien and dangerous. That is neither liberal nor scholarly; it is a smear tactic.

The apologist case reflects a tenuous grasp of social theory as well as a skewed definition of the American democratic tradition, especially in Ravitch's discussions of class, mobility and bureaucracy. She does not define class explicitly, nor even show that she is aware that more than one definition exists. Nonetheless, she asserts that class analysis is largely inappropriate to American history (pp. 43-44), citing evidence that most Americans regard themselves as middle class to support her position.

The type of analysis to which she objects allegedly rests on three assumptions: "first, that the United States is composed of distinct and fairly rigid classes; second, that people identify themselves as members of these distinct classes; and third, that people invariably recognize and act consistently with respect to their economic self-interest" (p. 43). That list is a caricature of class analysis and a travesty of revisionist historical arguments. In radical history, serious class analysis rejects purely subjective definitions or arbitrary divisions of people according to quantitative criteria

such as wealth or prestige scores. Rather, it attempts to view class as a relation, instead of as bumps in a system of stratification or as the artifact of an opinion poll. Class involves social relations broader than simple economic self-interest, and none of the historians Ravitch attacks has argued that people always act consistently, Ravitch does not understand class as a concept. She distorts the arguments of those she attacks and fails to marshal effective counter-evidence. She does not even bother to define the concept which she assaults.

Nor does she define bureaucracy, although she discusses it extensively. Her point appears to be that, although bureaucracy may be unpleasant, nonetheless it is inevitable and not, as I wrote, a "crystallization of bourgeois social values."[14] In support of her point, Ravitch notes that bureaucracy "is a characteristic organizational form in socialist and communist nations" (pp. 49-50). Contrary to what Ravitch maintains, everybody who has written on the subject points out that bureaucracy was a complex response to problems of social development, but that it was a response that embodied particular values and priorities. Each element of bureaucratic innovation was contested, sometimes fiercely, by sane, rational people. As Anthony Giddens points out, although Marx and Weber differed about the inevitability of bureaucracy, they agreed that it embodied the values of industrial capitalism.[15]

Moreover, Ravitch criticizes Bowles and Gintis for failing to account for bureaucracy in socialist or communist countries. Actually, they face the issue directly and effectively in a way that affirms their commitment to democratic values. They write:

> Why, then, has a democratic organization of work emerged in the existing socialist countries? If not a proof that technology requires hierarchical authority, does this fact not at least suggest the inevitable tendency for bureaucracies to come to control people's lives in modern society? We believe not. First, numerous plants in China, Cuba and Chile (during the Allende period) exhibited a substantial degree of worker control of production with positive results. Second, the state socialist countries of Eastern Europe were never democratic. Rather, the ruling elites have always maintained their power through top-down control of production, a centralized party structure, and the military. It is, therefore, not surprising that they have instituted a hierarchy in the workplace, a characteristic of corporate capitalist production.[16]

Ravitch's analysis of social mobility is no more accurate than her interpretation of class or bureaucracy. Her assertion that revisionists claim that "only those from high status families do well in school" (p. 73), is a preposterous fabrication. The same can be said of the unfounded claim that revisionists assert the "irrelevance of schooling" to social mobility (p. 74). Nor should one accept Ravitch's contention that "widespread" upward mobility would destroy the radical case (pp. 74-75).

Insofar as a consistent position can be found among the revisionists, it would be that schooling serves the well-to-do better than the poor and, by and large, helps to reproduce

rather than alter the class structure. That argument does not deny that substantial amounts of individual mobility always have taken place. But two points must be made concering this argument. First, social mobility has been largely structural. An expanding economy produced more white-collar, technical professional, and managerial positions than could be filled by the children of people already accupying similar occupations. Second, rates of occupational attainment have differed sharply by class. Different proportions of children from different social classes have attained high-ranking occupations. Working-class children always have done less well.[17]

Ravitch contends that the high rates of mobility which exist have been fostered by education. To support her point she uses Blau and Duncan's findings about occupational mobility to suggest that education matters more than social origins. Their data, however, show that although education plays a critical role in occupational attainment, social origins strongly influence the amount and nature of the education that young people receive. Working-class children are much less likely to receive the type of education that leads to the most desirable jobs.[18] Thus, she ignores both the structural basis of mobility--the number of openings--and the question of proportions--not the number but the share of children from various social backgrounds who reach different occupational levels.

In a chapter titled "Education Still Matters," Ravitch argues that the gap between white and black income has been narrowing; that the general situation of blacks has been improving; and that education has played a key role in this process.

> Just as dropping out was once an economically rational decision, getting more education is now as rational for blacks as it has been for whites....It is indisputable that full equality has not been achieved, but equally indisputable in the light of the evidence is the conclusion that a democratic society can bring about effective social change, if there are both the leadership and the political commitment to do so. (pp. 112-115)

These assertions conclude a chapter which omits any mention of unemployment, inflation, racial tension, trends in residential segregation, and the debased value of higher degrees on a tight job market. I am writing this in Philadelphia in August 1978, where unemployment for young black men hovers around 50 percent; racial segregation in housing has actually been increasing; jobs are leaving the city; and racial tensions are higher, most commentators maintain, than they have been for years.

One need not look beyond the source Ravitch herself used to show that her image of black progress has no substantial foundation, for she has made a selective use of a U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of Census report. That report shows that between 1970 and 1974 an increase in the ratio of black- to white-family income occurred only among husband-wife families headed by a person under the age of 35. Among

all families with husband and wife present, the ratio declined. Moreover, the proportion of families with both husband and wife present declined among Blacks and remained stable among whites. Partly as a result of the increase in female-headed households, the proportion of married black women in the labor force increased. Thus overall, between 1970 and 1974 the income of black families decreased relative to that of whites from .61 to .58. According to the report:

> Between 1970 and 1974, the proportion of black families with wives in the paid labor force declined from 36 to 33 percent: whereas the proportion of their white counterparts increased from 34 to 37 percent. Changes in the proportion of all families with working wives are a result of changes in first, the proportion of all families which are husband-wife families and, second, the proportion of husband-wife families with working wives.... Black husband-wife families as a percent of all families have declined; virtually no changes have been observed for their white counterparts during the 1970 to 1974 (income years)....The husband-wife families generally have median incomes which are higher than those of other types of families, primarily because they are more likely to have two earners....Between 1970 and 1974, the decline in the proportion of black husband-wife families has reduced the proportion of all black families with wives in the paid labor force. This pattern combined with changes which have occurred among white families has produced a downward effect upon the overall income of black to white families in the '70s.[19]

Ravitch does not cite the evidence in the same pamphlet that between 1967 and 1973 black family income decreased relative to white family income. Nor does she note that black unemployment is usually about twice as high as white; that black infant mortality in 1973 was only slightly lower than

the white rate was in 1950; or that black males in every age category from one year through age twenty-five could expect to live longer in 1959-61 than they could in 1973.[20] The situation did not change materially between 1974 and 1976 according to a report of the United States Commission on Civil Rights.[21]

Between 1960 and 1976 black college attendance increased. The proportion of black males aged twenty-five to twenty-nine who completed college rose from 4 percent to 11 percent, while the white male college attendance rate increased from 20 percent to 34 percent. The ratio of black to white thus rose from .20 to .32. However, most black males who had attended college were unable to find work to match their qualifications. The proportion in jobs that typically require less education than they had acquired was 58.8 percent in 1960 and 55.0 percent in 1976. Similarly, the proportion of black male high school graduates with jobs typically requiring no high school diploma shifted only from 70.2 percent to 67.2 in 1976.[22] Despite the civil rights movement and the War on Poverty, despite more years of education, black men have been unable to increase their chances for jobs for which they are qualified, and unemployment among them has worsened.

Ravitch's complacent view of America's past, present, and future, a story marred by unfortunate "lapses from the standard" (p. 11), leaves her unable to deal effectively with the origins of problems even she admits exist. Her list

of the problems in American education includes: "a decline in education standards, as evidenced by policies of automatic promotion in elementary and secondary schools, and at the post-secondary level, by the acceptance of grade inflation, diploma mills, and term-paper factories" (p. 171). Ravitch's only explanation of these problems is startlingly simplistic: "These changes did not come about solely because of the way history has been written in recent years, but the repeated assertions by historians and social scientists that schooling was of little or no intrinsic value has had its impact on policymakers" (p. 171). Although she does not state here what that impact has been, she perhaps has in mind what she asserted earlier, "to sap the political will that is necessary to effect change" (p. 115).

Ravitch has made an extraordinary claim. It assumes, first, that the average policymaker has been influenced by revisionist historians, a claim that is impossible to believe, and for which no evidence of any sort is offered. How many policymakers read history and how many are willing to entertain seriously a radical critique? Unless my own experience has been unusual, Ravitch's statement is absurd. More than that, Ravitch once again distorts the arguments she criticizes. "Revisionists" have never said that schooling has little or no intrinsic value. Their point, rather, has been that schooling has by and large helped to maintain and reproduce existing patterns of social structure and that edu-

cation reforms have not altered this state of affairs.

Even more seriously, Ravitch's assertion is scapegoating. By placing the responsibility for the problems of American education upon a group of historians while neglecting unemployment, inflation, racism, and the increasingly tenuous connection between education and work, Ravitch displaces the blame from where it should rest. The problem, she implies, does not lie in the distribution of power and resources, but rather lies with those carping critics who sow disaffection and erode the will to action. If Ravitch successfully were to silence or discredit the revisionists, would any of the great problems of American society or education improve?

Were Ravitch successful, it is she who would subvert school reform. The apathy and hostility, even violence, encountered daily in schools, public anger and disillusionment with public education, educators' sense of impotence and rage -- none of these can be explained by the apologist case. By offering a realistic explanation of the situation, the revisionists do more than the apologists to aid students and teachers to survive their daily lives with their sanity and self-esteem intact. All that Ravitch and the apologists can offer is to attempt to kill the messenger who brings bad news and to spin illusions of social progress.

It is important to understand why the apologist case surfaced in the late 1970s and why it has been welcomed in

many quarters. During the last decade one key message of social-science research has been that educational innovation and reform have failed. The War on Poverty and its related educational spinoffs have not attained their goals. As so often in American history, education was deployed as the primary weapon to fight poverty, crime, and social disorder, and, as before, schools have been unable to alleviate problems which have structural origins in the distribution of power and resources. Reform usually has rested on environmental assumptions that are inherently optimistic: altered environments can change character and behavior. As reforms have failed, hereditary theories have surfaced: problems of crime, poverty, and ignorance are not environmental but genetic. This familiar pattern in American history recurred during the 1960s and 1970s as the environmental theories underlying the optimism of the War on Poverty gave way to the hereditarian arguments of Jensen and Herrnstein.[23] Those who would resist genetic arguments have two alternatives. One is to recognize the structural origins of social problems and the inherently ineffectual nature of the reforms that have been attempted. The other is to argue the case for social progress, regardless of what the evidence shows. The latter is what Ravitch has done; it is what makes the apologist case so appealing.

Ravitch subtitled her last chapter "Limitations of the Ideological Approach." Characteristically, she does not

define ideology. Presumably it is bad, an attempt to put scholarship to the service of political goals whatever the evidence might show. Her assertion that the books she attacks, and not her own, are ideological is disingenuous at best. It is, in the last analysis, dangerous as well, and this is why such a slight, polemical volume deserves a lengthy review in a major journal.

I find Ravitch's book dangerous for three reasons. First, her book will be used, as it already has been, as ammunition by those who wish to assert the apologist case for American social institutions and to dampen the prospects for structural reform. Second, given her powerful sponsorship by the National Academy of Education, her work will receive broader attention than the ordinary polemic. Third, although Ravitch expresses a hope that her book will contribute to lively debate, the more likely consequence is a reduction in fruitful dialogue. Were her case that "revisionists" are simple-minded, dishonest ideologues responsible for a large share of our educational problems to be accepted, less "revisionist" work would be published. On a subtler level, once it is believed that critical history will meet with official disfavor, young scholars facing a tight job market will be reluctant to deviate far from center. Indeed, evidence exists that this has already begun to happen, not, of course, as a consequence of Ravitch, but as part of the turn to the right that has created a climate receptive to her

message. The times are right for scapegoats. That is why Ravitch's credibility is an important issue.[24]

FOOTNOTES

[1]Ravitch's book is an expansion of her article The Revisionists Revised: Studies in the Historiography of American Education, Proceedings of the National Academy of Education, 4 (1977), 1-84.

[2]I have repeatedly asked the former President of the Academy, Patrick Suppes, for details and have received only vague and unhelpful replies. My own correspondence is available upon request.

[3]Michael B. Katz, "The Origins of Public Education: A Reassessment," History of Education Quarterly, 16 (1976), 381-407, and "Origins of the Institutional State," Marxist Perspectives, 4 (1978), 6-22.

[4]For example, Walter Feinberg has attempted to correct Ravitch's distortion of his work in his essay in this collection, "Dewey as a Cultural Symbol: Some Reflections on Reason and Rhetoric and Its Critics."

[5]Michael B. Katz, The Irony of Early School Reform: Educational Innovation in Mid-Nineteenth Century Massachusetts (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968).

[6]Katz, Irony, pp. 20-21; pp. 272-279.

[7]Michael B. Katz, Class, Bureaucracy, and Schools: The Illusion of Educational Change in America (New York: Praeger, 1975), pp. 56-104; "The Emergence of Bureaucracy in Urban Education: The Boston Case, 1850-1884," Parts I and II, History of Education Quarterly, 8 (1968), 155-188, 319-357.

[8]Expanded edition, pp. 147-194; Michael B. Katz, The People of Hamilton, Canada West: Family and Class in a Mid-Nineteenth Century City (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975).

[9]Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, Schooling in Capitalist America: Educational Reform and the Contradictions of Economic Life (New York: Basic Books, 1976), esp. pp. 102-148 and pp. 201-223.

[10]Clarence Karier, The Shaping of the American Educational State (New York: Free Press, 1975).

[11]For example, Katz, Irony, pp. 217-218; Class, Bureaucracy, and Schools, pp. 141-142; "Origins," p. 403.

[12]Diane Ravitch, The Great School Wars (New York: Basic Books, 1974).

[13]Jane Addams, Democracy and Social Ethics (1902; republished Harvard University Press, 1964), p. 220.

[14]Michael Katz, Class, Bureaucracy and Schools, p. xxi.

[15]Anthony Giddens, Capitalism and Modern Social Theory: An Analysis of the Writings of Marx, Durkheim and Max Weber (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1971), pp. 232-238.

[16]Bowles and Gintis, p. 81.

[17]For an example of the way structural factors influence mobility rates, see Richard M. Bernard and John B. Sharpless, "Analyzing Structural Influences on Social History Data," Historical Methods, 2, No. 3 (1978), 112-131.

[18]Peter M. Blau and Otis Dudley Duncan, The American Occupational Structure (New York: Wiley, 1967), pp. 402-403 and pp. 405-406.

[19]Department of Commerce and Economic Statistics Administration, Bureau of Census, The Social and Economic Status of the Black Population in the United States, 1974, Current Population Reports, Special Studies, Series P-23, No. 54, July 1975, pp. 30,37.

[20]Bureau of the Census, Social and Economic Status, p. 123, 126.

[21]U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Social Indicators of Equality for Minorities and Women: A Report (Washington: GPO, 1978).

[22]Social Indicators, pp. 14, 18, 20.

[23]Katz, Irony, p. 111.

[24]See, for instance, the totally uncritical review in the Wall Street Journal, or the long review by Peter Clecak, The Chronicle (of Higher Education) Review, 16 Oct. 1978, R. 14-15. Clecak accepts as accurate all Ravitch's substantial criticism of the revisionists. His review is accompanied by an interview with Ravitch. The effect is to buttress her image as a fair, objective commentator. Reviewers should compare the accuracy of a criticism against the texts it attacks. The point, though, is that these reviews, like Ravitch's books, are an attempt to discredit radical scholarship masked by an assertion of objectivity and fairness.

On the Revision of the Revisionists

by

Paul C. Violas

Diane Ravitch's review of revisionism in educational history first appeared in the 1977 Proceedings of the National Academy of Education[1] and a year later was published under the same title, The Revisionists Revised, by Basic Books.[2] Both publications received considerable attention; the former, in part, because of the prestige of the Academy while the latter revised and expanded text reached a larger audience. Some in the liberal educational establishment believed this work had documented with finality the intellectual bankruptcy of a bothersome corpus of historical studies. Many of the authors indicted by Ravitch were indignant. Most of the latter felt she had indeed "revised" the revisionists--in some instances to the point where they disclaimed the interpretations attributed to them by Ravitch. Some were also surprised at the tone of her attack. I am grateful that the Academy has now offered some of the authors reviewed an opportunity to respond in the same forum the original attack appeared two years ago.

The section of The Revisionists Revised which addresses

my work is devoted exclusively to my essay on Jane Addams.[3] Ravitch begins with the charge that my essay is "an egregious example of tailoring quotes to fit the writer's ideology.... The words he quotes are hers, but in repeated instances, the context and meaning have been altered to match his point, not hers."[4] She then provides several illustrations of what purport to be abuses of the original context of Addams' words or distortions of Addams' meaning.

Ravitch's overarching objection to my interpretation of Addams' work seems to be, "His selections from her works are meant to demonstrate Violas' belief that Addams sacrificed individualism for the sake of a unified organic community."[5] In this statement Ravitch comes reasonably close to an understanding of the thesis of the essay, although she avoids the page and half of modifiers I provided to indicate that Addams rejected the nineteenth century or Classical Liberal conception of individualism in favor of a collective association which would yield a new social ideal and a new ideal community.[6] It is interesting that Ravitch avoids confronting the documentation provided to support this general thesis. Rather she concentrates her efforts on my analysis of the ramifications of this effort by Addams to construct a new social ideal and ideal community based on collective association instead of rugged individualism. Thus, we must turn to these illustrations to examine the validity of Ravitch's charges.

She begins with the assertion that I claimed Addams

commitment to a new ideal community "brought her to reject the ties of family, social class, ethnicity, and nationality."[7] Further she attributes to me the suggestion that Addams urged "the atomization of the individual and the destruction of the family."[8] If I had made the claims and suggestions which Ravitch attributes to me, then not only would my scholarship be as derelict as she implies but I would have proposed an interpretation so silly as to hardly require serious criticism.

The "if," however, is the issue. Let us consult the text which reads, "She rejected the family as a primary object of loyalty. Filial loyalty was too narrow and selfish ....Family claims on its individual's loyalty would have to be significantly altered in order to develop the ideal community. For similar reasons, Miss Addams rejected social class, ethnic groups, geographic areas, and even the nation state as the source of individual identification and validation."[9] I submit that Ravitch has misconstrued my statements. There is a significant difference between her words "rejected the family" or "urged the destruction of the family" and my own argument that Addams "rejected the family as the primary object of loyalty." To say that Addams rejected the family as the primary object of loyalty is not to say, as Ravitch implies I did, that Addams rejected completely the ties of family. Rather, the point is to acknowledge that Addams recognized the legitimacy of family claims, but she

was convinced that such claims, as I wrote, "would have to be significantly altered in order to develop the ideal community." Ravitch's parody of my claims implies that Addams found no use for these institutions or groupings and further leads to the notion that she urged the atomization of the individual. That, however, is Ravitch's interpretation of my essay and not my interpretation of Jane Addams. Indeed, the entire tenor and thrust of my analysis argued that Addams worked for a redirection, not destruction, of tradional loyalties toward ever more encompassing social units. Atomization of the individual was certainly not part of Addams' agenda and not implied in my analysis of her efforts.

Ravitch returns to my analysis of Addams' position on filial loyalty a second time and in this instance it is not my text but Addams' text which she confounds. She tries to suggest that my analysis is based on correctly worded quotes which, however, were tailored or taken out of context to alter Addams' meanings to suit my ideological position. Ravitch's argument here requires some extended treatment for it graphically displays her refusal to follow a complex argument over the course of an entire chapter in a primary source. It is best to allow her own words to outline the problem:

> He says, for instance, that "She rejected the family as a primary object of loyalty. Filial loyalty was too narrow and selfish: 'Our democracy is making in-roads upon the family, the oldest of human institutions, and a claim is being advanced which in a sense is larger than the family claim.'" In its context, the mean-

> ing of her sentence is unrelated to Violas' point. Addams, in Democracy and Social Ethics, was writing specifically about the dilemma of the educated woman in 1902, torn between those who tell her that her only role is to raise a family and her own desire to serve in some social role outside the family.[10]

Readers familiar with Addams' text will recognize a modicum of truth in Ravitch's argument, i.e., the paragraph from which I took the quote is primarily devoted to the problem of the woman's dilemma regarding her traditional family obligations and her newly evolving opportunities to contribute to a wider social sphere. Now, even if that was the entirety of the chapter entitled "Filial Relations" such a context would hardly render the meaning of Addams' sentence "unrelated to Violas' point." My point was that Addams argued that the family claims were often too narrow to ethically claim primary loyalty especially when outside claims called for ministering to broader needs. Addams' sentences which follow the one I quoted read, "The claim of the state in time of war has long been recognized, so that in its name the family has given up sons and husbands and even fathers of little children, if we can once see the claims of society in any such light, if its misery and need can be made clear and urged as an explicit claim, as the state urges its claims in time of danger, then for the first time the daughter who desires to minister to that need will be recognized as acting conscientiously."[11] Clearly, Addams' argument in behalf of the "educated woman" was based on her view that such loyalty

to a larger social unit had been legitimately and long recognized for "sons and husbands and even fathers of little children." She merely sought to extend to educated women what she viewed as legitimate and good for men. Thus, since Addams used the legitimate claims of the larger community on men as an analogy for extending it to the educated woman, it is entirely unreasonable and wrong for Ravitch to insist that this part of Addams' text is "unrelated to Violas' point." Moreover, had Ravitch attended to Addams' entire chapter she surely would have recognized this.

Much of Addams' chapter is devoted to the woman's problem of breaking out of traditionally defined wife-mother, family roles. This problem, however, is merely an illustrating of Addams' larger point that a multitude of traditional relationships must be transformed to facilitate the birth of her new social ideal. Addams explicitly states this thesis early in the chapter:

> In considering the changes which our increasing democracy is constantly making upon various relationships, it is impossible to ignore the filial relation. This chapter deals with the relation between parents and their grown-up daughters, as affording an explicit illustration of the perplexity and maladjustment brought about by the various attempts of young women to secure a more active share in community life.[12]

Ravitch apparently chose to ignore the first sentence of the above quote and concentrate her emphasis on the second. Such exclusive emphasis, however, seems to alter Addams' intent and meaning. Clearly Addams was asserting that among those

various relationships being changed, traditional family relations should be readjusted in light of the demand for a more inclusive social obligation. In those instances where family claims conflict with the claims of a more encompassing social ideal it was clear to Addams which claim should take precedent:

> The collision of interests, each of which has a real moral basis and a right to its own place in life, is bound to be more or less tragic. It is the struggle between two claims, the destruction of either of which would bring ruin to ethical life. Curiously enough, it is almost exactly this contradiction which is the tragedy set forth by the Greek dramatist, who asserted that the gods who watch over the sanctity of the family bond must yield to the claims of the gods of the state. The failure to recognize the social claim as legitimate causes the trouble; the suspicion constantly remains that woman's public efforts are merely selfish and captious, and are not directed to the general good.[13]

If any suspicion remains regarding Addams' intentions for reconstruction of filial loyalty let us return again to her words:

> There came periods of reconstruction, during which the task is laid upon a passing generation, to enlarge the function and carry forward the ideal of a long-established institution....The family, like every other element of human life is susceptible of progress, and from epoch to epoch its tendencies and aspirations are enlarged, although its duties can never be abrogated and its obligations can never be cancelled....The family in its various members together must recognize and acknowledge the validity of the social obligation.[14]

And surely, as the final sentences above indicate, Addams did not speak exclusively to the problem of the woman viz. filial loyalty; and if one continues to believe that even this is speculation, on the page following the above passages, she provides the example of St. Francis Assisi in similar conflict with his father:

> Such glimpses remind us of that tragedy enacted centuries ago in Assisi when the eager young noble cast his very clothing at his father's feet, dramatically renouncing his filial allegiance, and formally subjecting the narrow family claim to the wider and more universal duty. All conflict of tragedy ensued which might have been averted, had the father recognized the higher claim, and had he been willing to subordinate and adjust his own claim to it.[15]

My point was that although Addams' ideal community was not clearly defined in her writings, it "was quite similar to the Social Gospel concept of the Brotherhood of Man." And for this new ideal community she "rejected the family as the primary object of loyalty. Filial loyalty was too narrow and selfish," thus "family claims on its individual's loyalty would have to be significantly altered in order to develop the ideal community." I concluded that Addams believed "men must devote themselves to the largest possible social unit and develop a sense of 'cosmic patriotism'." As supporting evidence for this point I quoted Addams' statement: "Our democracy is making in-roads upon the family, the oldest of human institutions, and a claim is being advanced which in a certain sense is larger than the family claim."[16] It should be relatively easy for the reader to judge which critic has

abused the context of Addams' words.

There is one factual point in Ravitch's review which is correct. As she finds, footnote no. 22 in my essay incorrectly refers the reader to page 141 of Addams' The Spirit of Youth in The City Streets.[17] The correct pagination should be 141-147. Even here, however, Ravitch draws an incorrect inference from my error. What I was trying to indicate with this reference was that there were certain aspects of immigrant cultures which required some modification if the immigrant's ethnic loyalty was not to conflict with the larger social loyalty she desired. Ravitch argues that I sought to use this citation to support a contention that Addams wished to strip the immigrants of their cultural identity. Of course, citation no. 22 would not support such a conclusion. Although there is evidence in reference nos. 29, 30, and 31 to support that inference, the question of whether or to what degree Addams desired to "strip" immigrants of their cultural identity is complex and not nearly as clear cut as I had thought when the essay was written.[18] There is clear evidence in the above noted citations that, in these instances, she was arguing that immigrants were excellent building blocks for the new society because of the relative ease with which they could be brought to the simplest common elements of humanity. Nevertheless, it is equally clear from the larger corpus of her work that Jane Addams was not a simple anglo-conformity Americanizer, that she did value certain aspects

of immigrant culture, especially when those aspects were congruent with the values she saw necessary for the new social idea. My present view on this question emphasizes this later emphasis in Addams' thought.[19]

Much less complex is Addams' position regarding workers and industrial conflict. The issue becomes somewhat murky in Ravitch's review. After analyzing Addams' discussion of her Hull House exhibit depicting the historical evolution of spinning wheels in which she argued that the worker should understand that industrial evolution was orderly and peaceful throughout history, I argued that Addams was so concerned to develop a social ideal free of conflict that even living in the midst of the Haymarket riots she "proposed to teach the worker that even when his situation was desperate, industrial conflict was not necessary."[20] Ravitch's response to the term conflict is vitriolic, "This is an extreme distortion of both what she wrote and what she meant. Addams expressed the wish that strikes could proceed without violence because she believed that violence turns public opinion against the workers ....Clearly, it was not industrial conflict she opposed, but violence....While her pacifism may have been naive, it was sincere and not just a tactic to disarm the proletariat."[21]

There are several issues embedded in Ravitch's charge which deserve to be unpacked and individually examined. First, Ravitch's pronouncement of Addams' naive pacifism should not be allowed to stand unchallenged. This is a tactic all too

often used by those who think they are defending the good reputation of early Progressive leaders. When a problematic aspect of a Progressive's thought surfaces it is dismissed with the notation that it resulted from naivety, lack of understanding, or some other judgement which portrays the Progressive as less adept than she or he otherwise might have been judged. With this line of defense one can well imagine these historical actors asking to be left to their "enemies" and saved from their "friends." In fairness to the dead, historians should take their ideas and proposals seriously. Jane Addams' pacifism was not naive, rather it was a significant aspect of her social philosophy and a cornerstone of her new social ideal. Collective association required peace, order and absence of conflict.

Secondly, Ravitch's disclaimer that Addams' pacifism was not just a tactic to disarm the proletariat is interesting but diversionary. She apparently believes that my essay posed Addams as a disingenuous friend of the workers and a proponent of the interests of capital. If so, then she has confused my analysis. Explicit in the entire essay is the understanding that Addams' work contains no deliberately hidden meanings; Addams, like most of the early Progressives, was proud of her efforts and made every effort to explain them fully and forthrightly. Moreover, there is no hint that she wished to favor capital over labor. Her sincerity was unquestioned. She sincerely wished to avoid conflict.

The third and most important issue raised by Ravitch's charge relates to Addams' position on industrial conflict. Ravitch attempts to distinguish between conflict and violence. This distinction seems odd when it is remembered that I used the term "conflict" to distinguish a condition which was not peaceful and orderly. Most usual connotations of these words would indicate that this usage was not outlandish. Ravitch, however, insists on the distinction because Addams was hostile to violent strikes. Somehow, according to Ravitch, the fact that Addams rejected violent strikes renders my judgment that she urged against conflict an "extreme distortion" of Addams' words and meanings. She seems to imply that what Addams really meant was that industrial conflict and strikes were acceptable to the new social ideal except in those cases where violence occured. One can make such a distinction only at the risk of constructing an abstraction innocent of American labor history. It is the case that during the time Addams' wrote her most significant work "orderly" industrial conflict and "peaceful" strikes were indeed a rarity. Industrial conflict and strikes were nearly synonymous with violence. One generally accepted history of industrial relations during the Progressive era characterizes the mood thusly:

> A dominant motif emerged from the numerous and apparent diverse strikes investigated by the Commission. In conflict after conflict, either one or both sides struck a posture of unyielding obduracy which produced open violence.

> Regardless of cause, geographic location, type of industry, or ethnic grouping, turbulence in industrial relations flared all over the United States. On labor's side, native Americans as well as immigrants plunged into the battle. Many management leaders of old American stock willingly employed the tactics of war. Industrialization had outdistanced American social attitudes and institutions. In many cases this led to a collapse of civil authority, to near-anarchy, and to military rule.[22]

Ravitch's charge seems little more than a bit of linguistic hairsplitting which can be sustained only by ignoring the known history of Addams' time.

Ravitch concludes her critique of my work with the objection that, "Perhaps Violas' most outrageous misrepresentation is his suggestion that Addams presaged fascism."[23] Once again, however, Ravitch misconstrues what I wrote. I did not say that Addams' calls for mass demonstrations, utilization of national holidays, street processions, martial music and the mass expression of emotion through symbols to mobilize collective spirit and action either "presaged fascism" or was an "expression of incipient totalitarianism" as Ravitch suggests. I simply said that such expressions "reverberates through the charred corridors of the twentieth century with deafening resonance."[24] If Diana Ravitch is deaf to that resonance then one can only suggest that she examine the mass gatherings at Neuremburg in the thirties, the utilization of emotional expression of symbols by Josef Goebbels, the May Day Celebrations in the USSR and Havana, The Red Guard outbursts in Peking, or the quasi-religious utilization of mass

gatherings at professional football games by American war-planners during the late 1960's and early 1970's. It is indeed unfortunate that her historic memory is so short or perhaps selectively sanitized. It is difficult to believe that any fair minded scholar could read pages 95-100 in Addams' The Spirit of Youth in the City Streets and fail to hear the resonance.[25]

Several factors seem to emerge from the above examinations of the charges leveled by Diane Ravitch. First, they are at best problematic. Most seem based on Ravitch's misconstruing either the author's analysis or the primary sources and her willingness to overlook the known historical facts of the era under investigation. Second, the tone of Ravitch's charges seems directed more to an attack on the personal integrity and scholarly abilities of the authors she indictes rather than to the advancement of an intellectual dialogue. Moreover, this tone is all too prevading in her review. More than simply strident and polemic, it is often vicious and demeaning. Through both publications one finds phrases like "slipshod research," "outrageous fabrication," "extreme distortion," and implied as well as explicit suggestions that an author has deliberately distorted meanings by abusing the contextual character of selected quotes. Such charges are not normally part of a scholarly dialogue, even when they could be substantiated.

When such charges are leveled in publications as presti-

gious as the Proceedings of the National Academy of Education the editors usually exercise the responsibility to verify their validity and, at the very least, offer those attacked the invitation to respond. Moreover, one can only speculate on the career damage inflicted on those attacked in this manner. It should be remembered that in today's hectic academic world, Deans and other university administrators who have considerable impact in areas of hiring, promotion and salary increments often do not have the time to follow scholarly research in all areas. They frequently rely on prestige indicators such as the National Academy of Education. When a respected scholarly organization like the Academy supports a research project and subsequently publishes the results in its Proceedings without comment and without speedy response, it is likely to have an effect. One is left to ponder why these scholarly courteousies were not observed in this case. While I am grateful for the present invitation, why did two years elapse before it was extended? Any why did the invitation state that it was "following up on an invitation to 'rebut' proferred by the NAEd's then-president, Pat Suppes?" The invitation I received on March 27, 1979 was the only invitation I have received from the Academy. One also wonders why all of the authors indited by Ravitch were not extended an invitation at this time. Perhaps these questions can be explained as a clerical error or the notorious inefficiency of the U.S. mail. One would certainly hope this is the correct explanation.

FOOTNOTES

[1]Diane Ravitch, "The Revisionists Revised," Proceedings of the National Academy of Education, Vol. 4, 1977, pp. 1-84.

[2]Diane Ravitch, The Revisionists Revised (New York: Basic Books, 1978).

[3]Paul C. Violas, "Jane Addams and the New Liberalism," In Clarence J. Karier, Paul Violas, and Joel Spring, Roots of Crisis (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1973) pp. 66-84.

[4]Ravitch, The Revisionists Revised, p. 131. Subsequent references to Ravitch will be from this book as it probably represents her more refined position.

[5]Ibid.

[6]Violas, "Jane Addams" pp. 70-71.

[7]Ravitch, p. 131.

[8]Ravitch, p. 132.

[9]Violas, "Jane Addams" p. 72.

[10]Ravitch, p. 131-132.

[11]Jane Addams, Democracy and Social Ethics (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press, 1964; orig. 1902) p. 77-78

[12]Ibid., p. 73.

[13]Ibid., p. 76-77.

[14]Ibid., p. 78-79.

[15]Ibid., p. 80.

[16]Violas, "Jane Addams" p. 71-72.

[17]Ravitch, p. 132.

[13]Violas, "Jane Addams" p. 73.

[19]See e.g.: Paul C. Violas, The Training of the Urban Working Class (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1978) pp. 42, 46, 52-53, 87-88.

[20]Violas, "Jane Addams" p. 77-78.

[21]Ravitch, p. 133-134.

[22]Graham Adams, Jr., Age of Industrial Violence 1910-1915, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966) p. 228.

[23]Ravitch, p. 134.

[24]Violas, "Jane Addams" p. 81.

[25]Jane Addams, The Spirit of Youth and the City Streets (Urbana, Ill.: Univ. of Ill. Press, 1972; orig. 1909).